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INTRODUCTION
Internet has changed our way of life-television merely the
look of our living rooms: The once decorative coffee table around
which we used to sit as children whenever our parents forced us
to communicate became a mere holding space for plates and
mugs. We became spectators, arranging our chairs to face the
corner of our living room; there, our TV was flickering.1
Somehow, TV managed to enter the intimacy of the world's
families.
Showing such pervasive effects,2 TV might be one of the most
powerful gadgets invented, powerful enough to change our way of
life, our culture, and our viewpoints, potent enough even to
overthrow presidents and to steer politics. Politicians still seek
to restrain the might of TV (the influence of broadcasters,
networks, cable operators, and media corporations). Today's
media, however, has at its disposal a myriad of ways to convey
content. Amazed, we watch our children sitting in front of the
TV, checking their e-mails on a laptop, taking calls on their
mobile, and probably downloading music from a dubious Russian
Website-all simultaneously, drowned in content from diverse
sources.
With all these platforms bearing content, even the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") admits that the historic
rationale for broadcasting regulation-scarcity-is flawed.3
Today, broadcast regulation with all its spillover effects looks like
a grotesque attempt by governments to regain control over
information flows. The FCC rightly hesitates to extend its
regulatory grip to Internet-based audiovisual services and
struggles to implement regulation consistent with First
Amendment requirements. Future court decisions might dismiss
the scarcity rationale4 and give rise to a policy change resulting
' See Heribert Seifert, Verlorene Zeit [Lost Time], NZZ FOLIO, Feb. 2001,
http://www.nzzfolio.ch/www/d80bd7 lb-b264-4db4-afd0-277884b93470/showarticle/
57d97e81-2b02-4e0c-9a6c-aa79f4fdf646.aspx.
2 See Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 193 (1943) (emphasizing
the "far-reaching role which radio plays in our society").
3 See JOHN W. BERRESFORD, FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N MEDIA BUREAU STAFF,
THE SCARCITY RATIONALE FOR REGULATING TRADITIONAL BROADCASTING 30 (2005),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-257534Al.pdf.
' The Supreme Court, however, indicated in FCC v. League of Women Voters,
that it will refrain from reconsidering the scarcity rationale "without some signal
from Congress or the FCC that technological developments have advanced so far
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in abrogation or limitation of the scope of broadcasting
regulation. Then, Congress would need to determine whether to
keep some regulatory regime for (all) audiovisual media in
place. In contrast to the United States' regulatory restraint, the
European Union adopted a new legal framework on December 11,
2007, which covers all audiovisual media services, irrespective of
technology or distribution platform used.' It imposes strict
behavioral restraints on broadcasters, regardless of whether they
distribute content over the Internet or airwaves. Unfortunately,
these new rules seem still inspired by an old media environment.
They hardly try to address phenomena like YouTube or Tudou,
YouTube's larger Shanghai clone, and their consequences on the
future provision of TV-like services.
The European Regulators' grab at the Internet is explained
by fundamental differences in the way the broadcasting industry
emerged. Broadcasting in the United States draws upon the
initiative of private entrepreneurs; public service broadcasting in
the United States is decentralized and not government
operated.6 The Public Broadcasting Service ("PBS") with its 355
member TV stations averaged a modest 1.4 percent primetime
rating during the 2006-2007 season.7  In contrast, most
European countries-Great Britain, Germany, France,
Switzerland, Austria, etc.-rely on strong, publicly-funded TV
stations and networks for broadcasting.8  Traditionally,
European governments have protected their public service
broadcasters by providing them with regulatory and financial
advantages and by limiting the leeway of private broadcasters. 9
Like private TV and radio stations, public service
broadcasters enjoy the protection of freedom of speech.
Unfortunately, this protection has rendered European public
broadcasters largely unaccountable to the public. Today, public
broadcasters in Europe abuse their privileges to expand their
that some revision of the system of broadcast regulation may be required." 468 U.S.
364, 376 n.11 (1984).
" Council Directive 2007/65, 2007 O.J. (L332) 27 (EC).
6 See Eli M. Noam & Jens Waltermann, Public Television: Past Promises and
Future Opportunities: An Introduction, in PUBLIC TELEVISION IN AMERICA 8 (Eli M.
Noam & Jens Waltermann eds., 1998).
7 About PBS: Corporate Facts, http://www.pbs.orglaboutpbs/aboutpbs-corp.html
(last visited Nov. 2, 2008).
8 See infra Part II.A.
9 See infra Parts III.B, III.D, and III.H.
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services to print media and the Internet, thereby menacing
incumbents that do not enjoy subsidies.1" Regulatory
shortcomings are left in place, all relevant players-politicians,
broadcasters, film producers-having more to lose than to gain
from changes. Diversity of content, the overarching regulatory
goal on both continents,11 is reduced to a mere fig leaf justifying
the inefficiencies of the current legal framework.
Diverse content, that is, the quantity of broadcast content,
has vastly increased due to competition for attention of the
audience. Unlike Internet users, however, the individual
spectator is left without much power to actively promote specific
content on TV. His power is to opt out of a certain program, for
example, to switch from CSI New York to CSI Miami. The "Iron
Law of Television" suggests that a single broadcaster will try to
maximize its audience-and hence its advertising revenue-by
appealing "to the broadest cross-section of the population, often
with programming of the lowest common denominator-bland,
uncontroversial, and usually uninteresting."'2 Despite the use of
intrusive instruments, behavioral limits on programmers hardly
managed to improve the quality of broadcast. The European
tradition of strong public service broadcasters might provide
some leverage in maintaining quality; however, governments
sponsoring broadcasting are walking a tightrope between
First Amendment infringements and maintaining adequate
accountability.
Part I of this Article sets out today's rationales for strong
public service broadcasting and tight regulation of audiovisual
media. Part II explains the key characteristics and main pitfalls
of American and European broadcasting regulation. Part III sets
10 See infra Part III.H.
1 See, e.g., Cecilia Rothenberger, The UHF Discount: Shortchanging the Public
Interest, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 689, 692-94 (2004); see also Principles and Guidelines for
the Community's Audiovisual Policy in the Digital Age: Communication from the
Commission to the Council, EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 657) 8 (1999).
12 Laurence H. Winer, The Signal Cable Sends-Part I: Why Can't Cable Be
More Like Broadcasting, 46 MD. L. REV. 212, 252 (1987); see also ROGER
SCHAWINSKI, DIE TV-FALLE [THE TV TRAP] 93-115 (2007); C. Edwin Baker, Giving
the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311, 335 (1997) (arguing that it is the
primary incentive of media to provide a package that has the broadest, even if
shallowest, appeal); Laurence G.C. Kaplan, The European Community's "Television
Without Frontiers" Directive: Stimulating Europe to Regulate Culture, 8 EMORY INT'L
L. REV. 255, 335-36 (1994) (arguing that "a liberalized television environment
invariably will lead to a flood of low-quality imports, typically American").
1450 [Vol. 82:1447
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the cornerstones for a revised regulatory framework, committed
to the goals of both the American and European legal framework,
and ready to face the completion of convergence of all
(audiovisual) media.
I. DIVERSITY AS MODERN RATIONALE FOR REGULATING
AUDIOVISUAL MEDIA
Scarcity of available spectrum is the traditional rationale for
regulating broadcasting. 13 Spectrum itself, however, was never
scarce. Spectrum has to be distinguished from information
outlets ("channels"), demand for which traditionally exceeds
supply. Today, the amount of spectrum allocated for
broadcasting provides space for quite a number of TV and radio
stations. Further, technical platforms like Internet, cable, and
Direct Broadcast Satellite ("DBS") make it possible to convey
information via an abundance of channels.
In audiovisual media markets, scarcity of available channels
translates into a general threat to diversity. Independent of
scarcity, possible threats to diversity might still be part of a
rationale for regulating broadcasting specifically and audiovisual
media generally. Further, diversity is closely related to the
desire to preserve the cultural identity of distinguished social
groups and local forms of culture, both of which legislators regard
as a strong rationales for regulating audiovisual media. Some
commentators even claim that private programming in
audiovisual media is generally of inferior quality. In particular,




Ever since the electromagnetic spectrum was put to
commercial use, it has been regarded as a scarce resource,
meaning that demand for spectrum exceeds supply. Scarcity
constitutes an impediment to "the widest possible dissemination
of information from diverse and antagonistic sources."15 For this
reason, scarcity was the main rationale for regulating broadcast
'" See BERRESFORD, supra note 3, at 1.
14 See Philip M. Napoli, Access and Fundamental Principles in Communication
Policy, 2002 MICH. ST. L. REV. 797, 798-99 (2002).
15 See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
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media. However, if we care to believe physicists, and we should,
this assumption was never correct. The electromagnetic
spectrum is not a tangible item or resource comparable to assets
like real estate or moveable objects. The spectrum itself and the
amount of available frequencies are in fact unlimited, the short
wavelength limit likely being the Planck length and the long
wavelength limit being the size of the universe itself.16
Nevertheless, the scarcity rationale initially found wide
approval with regulators and courts. 7 Their endorsement of it is
not based on a "fundamental misunderstanding of physics,""8 but
rather on the perception that the number of channels available
for broadcasting is limited for several reasons. First, the
frequency band available is limited by governments reserving
frequency bands for their own use (for example, military
purposes, coast guard) or uses other than commercial
broadcasting (for example, telecommunications networks). 9
Second, signals transmitted on the same or nearly the same
frequency may interact, thereby severely deteriorating the
quality of the content broadcast; such interference made it
necessary to space channels. 20  Third, certain frequencies may
not be used for broadcasting content for technical reasons,
because the wavelength is too large to allow for reasonably-sized
antenna.21  These reasons combined reduce the amount of
available channels to a finite number.
The scarcity rationale for regulating broadcasting (and cable)
has not remained unchallenged. Some scholars argue that
virtually all goods are scarce.22 Scarcity of goods alone, however,
has not prompted legislators to regulate access to resources. 23
16 See OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHYSICS (John Daintith & Alan Isaacs eds.,
2000).
7 See, e.g., Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943);
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 28, 1961, 12
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 205 (261-62) (F.R.G.),
translation available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/
work-new/germancase.php?id=652.
18 BERRESFORD, supra note 3, at 9.
19 See Bruce M. Owen, Regulatory Reform: The Telecommunications Act of 1996
and the FCC Media Ownership Rules, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 671, 689-90 (2003).
20 See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994); Nat'l Broad. Co.,
319 U.S. at 212-13.
21 See MINORU FUJIMOTO, PHYSICS OF CLASSICAL ELECTROMAGNETISM 184
(2007).
22 See, e.g., Winer, supra note 12, at 236-38.
213 See id.
1452 [Vol. 82:1447
YOUTUBE TO BE REGULATED?
Neither the United States nor Europe regulates access to scarce
resources like real estate, gold, or currency. Also, scarce goods
are not awarded to applicants on the basis of merit, age, gender,
or race, but rather on the basis of a buyer's willingness to pay. In
contrast to available channels for broadcasting, most scarce
goods get allocated by market forces. Thus, scarcity does not
provide a rationale in itself for regulating broadcasting. As the
scarcity rationale becomes less and less plausible, other reasons
need to be established if broadcast regulation is to withstand
First Amendment challenges in the future.
Unlike other goods, scarcity of available channels has a
direct impact on another market, the "marketplace of ideas."24
Whilst only a few broadcasters could be accommodated, some
applicants were not able to broadcast at all, either being denied
an individual channel or access to a channel. Such restricted
access to channels may result in ideas not being uttered, either
because these ideas are perceived as false, irrelevant, or as a
challenge to the own agenda. Limited access to channels-in
broadcasting as well as in cable-restricts, as a consequence, free
speech. Thus, a rationale for broadcasting and cable regulation
is scarcity's inherent restriction on speech* and scarcity's
potential challenge to diversity of opinions and-last but not
least--democracy.25
The potential for diversity of opinions is increasing with the
amount of available broadcasting channels. Technological
improvements like digital terrestrial broadcasting, cable TV, and
the Internet (IPTV Platforms like Hulu 26, Mogulus, 27 or Zattoo28 )
24 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); see also Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("But when men have realized that time has
upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas . . ").
25 See, e.g., Observer & Guardian v. United Kingdom, 216 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
59 (1991) (stressing the fundamental role of freedom of expression in a democratic
society, in particular where, through the press or audiovisual media, it serves to
impart information and ideas of general interest, which the public is moreover
entitled to receive); see also Napoli, supra note 14, at 799 (arguing that "the
availability of diverse sources and ideas is seen as essential to the well-informed
political decision making that underlies a well-functioning democracy").
26 Hulu offers premium programming to audiences within the United States at
http://www.hulu.com.
27 It is possible to set up a live broadcast channel via Mogulus at
http://www.mogulus.com.
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have significantly increased the amount of available channels.29
The attention of the audience, however, is scarce; 30 likewise, the
willingness of the audience to invest large amounts of time in
seeking out new offers in the audiovisual landscape is limited.
Concentrated ownership of channels (TV and radio stations) adds
another challenge to diversity. Like the Lernaean Hydra's many
heads and tongues emanating from one body (and mindset), a
multitude of channels under single ownership does not increase
diversity.3 1 Further, clever branding of a channel may attract an
extra share of viewers, making market entry difficult and leaving
smaller channels starving or even idle. For all these reasons, an
abundance of channels does not in itself guarantee sustainable
diversity.32
The described danger of media market concentration and
its inherent challenge to diversity puts forward a rationale
for regulating media independent from the traditional
scarcity rationale.33  The German Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) explicitly embraced this line of
2S Zattoo offers more than forty European channels at http://zattoo.com.
'9 The number of TV channels that the average U.S. home receives was 104.2 in
2006, up from 18.8 channels in 1985. Average U.S. Home Now Receives a Record
104.2 TV Channels, According to Nielsen, NIELSEN MEDIA RES., Mar. 19, 2007,
http://www.nielsenmedia.com/ncportal/site/Public/menuitem.55dc65b4a7d5adff3f65
936147a062a0/?vgnextoid=48839bc66a96111OVgnVCM100000acOa260aRCRD.
" See Herbert A. Simon, Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich
World, in COMPUTERS, COMMUNICATION, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 40-41 (Martin
Greenberger ed., 1971).
1' See Elizabeth Knowles, Hydra, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHRASE AND
FABLE (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2006), available at http://www.oxfordreference.com/
views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t214.e3468; Ron Leadbetter, Hydra,
ENCYCLOPEDIA MYTHICA ONLINE, http://www.pantheon.orglarticles/h/hydra.html.
12 See M6nica Arifto & Christian Ahlert, Beyond Broadcasting: The Digital
Future of Public Service Broadcasting, 22 PROMETHEUS 398, 399-400 (2004)
(arguing that "more producers do not necessarily mean more choice," because
"[clontent is still competing for the same eyeballs"); see also Stanley Ingber, The
Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 38 (1984) (arguing
that monopolistic practices, economies of scale, and an unequal distribution of
resources have made it difficult for new ventures to enter the business of mass
communications). The marketplace of ideas' inevitable bias supports entrenched
power structures, supporting those ideas appealing to the self-interest of individuals
who manage the media. Id. at 39.
11 See KLAUS A. VALLENDER, PETER HETTICH & JENS LEHNE,
WIRTSCHAFTSFREIHEIT UND BEGRENZTE STAATSVERANTWORTUNG [ECONOMIC
LIBERTY AND LIMITED RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE] 283, 909-10 (4th ed. 2007).
1454 [Vol. 82:1447
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argument. 4 The Court rejected the idea that broadcasting
regulation might become obsolete as soon as scarcity of channels
is overcome. Competition, according to the German
Constitutional Court, does not result automatically in a diverse
supply of content. 6 Regulatory safeguards need to be put in
place in order to satisfy the standards for freedom of speech as
derived from the German Constitution.3
The approach of the German Constitutional Court may be
taken to its logical conclusion by applying the line of argument to
other media. Until today, speech in print media and the Internet
has remained largely unregulated (or self-regulated). If an
abundance of channels does not eo ipso result in diversity in
broadcasting, then print media and even the Internet do not
guarantee diversity. With diversity being the ultimate goal of
intervention, legislators would need to inquire whether features
of print and Internet media markets differ from broadcasting in a
way that warrants preferential treatment.8  If no such
distinguishing features exist anymore, legislators need to assess
whether broadcast regulation should be abrogated or extended to
all audiovisual services regardless of their technical platform
(broadcast, cable, Internet, etc.). Indeed, the European Union
adopted a new audiovisual media services directive on December
11, 2007, which covers all "television-like" audiovisual services.39
In contrast to the European approach, the U.S. Supreme
Court is locked into the scarcity rationale, waiting for "some
signal from Congress or the FCC" before considering a limitation
of broadcasting regulation.4 ° As a consequence, regulation is
submitted to a different level of scrutiny depending on the
34 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June




37 Grundgesetz fiir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Basic Law] May 23,
1949, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1.] 2002 I S. 2862-63, art. 5(1); see BVerfG, June 16,
1981, 57 BVerfGE 295 (F.R.G.).
38 See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(finding that "important differences between cable and broadcast television and
'differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First
Amendment standards applied to them'" (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 386, 389 (1969))).
19 See Council Directive 2007/65, 16-17 2007 O.J. (L 332) 27 (EC).
40 See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.11 (1984).
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affected platform: While broadcasters face a heavy regulatory
burden, cable companies enjoy more freedom, and Internet
Service Providers largely remain unrestrained. 41  The U.S.
Supreme Court has tolerated a vast amount of restrictions
affecting traditional broadcasters. The Court has upheld
content-neutral broadcasting regulation when the restriction was
narrowly tailored and furthered a substantial, not compelling,
governmental interest.42  With regard to content-based
restrictions, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledges that "of all
forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the
most limited First Amendment protection.
The U.S. Supreme Court submits content-neutral regulation
of cable,' as well as direct broadcast satellite systems ("DBS") to
the more rigorous O'Brien standard of scrutiny.4" Unlike
broadcasters, cable systems were not perceived as a big threat to
diversity, because spectrum scarcity and signal interference do
not apply to cable. Until the Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984,46 cable regulation consisted of a mere spillover from
broadcasting. 47 Eager to maintain programmer's access to cable
41 See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 741 & nn.16-17, 748 (1978)
("We have long recognized that each medium of expression presents special First
Amendment problems.").
42 See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 380; see also FCC v. Nat'l Citizens
Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 798-802 (1978) (upholding a ban on certain
newspaper-broadcast combinations); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 375-78, 387-89 (holding
the fairness doctrine to be constitutional and to "enhance rather than abridge the
freedoms of... the First Amendment"); Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.
190, 218-19 (1943) (confirming that the FCC has the authority to regulate network
practices contrary to public interests).
' Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 748 (sustaining a partial ban of indecent speech,
which was deemed to serve the compelling interest of protecting minors); see also
Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127-28 (1989) (distinguishing
Pacifica with regard to telecommunications).
See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 623, 661-62 (1994)
(regarding the must-carry rules in question as "content neutral and thus ... not
subject to strict scrutiny"); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)
(finding that regulation of speech may be justified if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest and if the provisions do not burden substantially
more speech than necessary to further that interest); see also Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 185 (1997).
41 See Satellite Broad. & Commc'n Ass'n v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337, 354-55 (4th Cir.
2001) (upholding must-carry obligations for direct broadcast satellite providers); cf.
infra notes 231-233 and accompanying text.
I Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 2, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984).
41 See United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968). The Court
upheld an interim order of the FCC restricting the expansion of CATV service in
1456
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systems from diverse sources, the courts sustained must-carry
requirements, 48 as well as rules requiring cable operators to
reserve channels for leased access and public, educational, and
governmental programming. 49 The courts, however, have refused
to sustain the siphoning rules5° or the strict cable ownership
limits of the FCC,51 some of which have recently been reenacted.52
With regard to content-based restrictions, a heavy burden lies on
areas in which the service had not operated previously, pending hearings on the
merits of the incumbent local broadcasters complaint. The order was held to be
covered by the FCC's responsibilities for providing a widely dispersed TV service.
Lacking a clear congressional mandate for cable regulation, the authority of the FCC
was
restricted to that reasonably ancillary to the effective performance .of the
Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television
broadcasting. The Commission [could], for these purposes, issue 'such rules
and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not
inconsistent with law,' as 'public convenience, interest, or necessity
requires.'
Id. at 178 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (2000)); see also United States v. Midwest Video
Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 653-54 (1972) (upholding regulation, which required cable
systems to operate as local outlets by cablecasting and to make available facilities
for local production and presentation of programs); Carter Mountain Transmission
Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1963). In Carter, the court affirmed the
FCC's denial for permission to construct a microwave communication system to
transmit signals to community antenna systems, because the improved community
antenna television (CATV) service would threaten the local TV station. Thereby, the
court gave indirect effect to the broadcasting regime on CATV. Id. at 363-64. But see
FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 708-09 (1979) (holding that the FCC
lacked statutory authority to promulgate access rules, i.e., requiring cable operators
to reserve channels for public, governmental, educational, and leased access).
4s See Turner Broad. Sys., 520 U.S. at 180-83; see also Gary Lutzker, The 1992
Cable Act and the First Amendment: What Must, Must Not, and May Be Carried, 12
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 467, 477-90 (1994). But see Quincy Cable Television, Inc.
v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that the FCC had failed
adequately to articulate and tailor the government's substantial interest in the
must-carry rules so as to overcome the cable operator's First Amendment right to
editorial autonomy).
" See Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
50 See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding
that the FCC is required to demonstrate that the objectives to be achieved by
regulating cable TV are also objectives for which the Commission could legitimately
regulate the broadcast media); see also infra note 220.
" See Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1139-44 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(reversing the rules on horizontal and vertical limits on ownership and letting
survive the FCC's threshold for attribution of a broadcast station to be controlled or
influenced by cable operators); see also infra Part II.C.
5 See infra Part II.C.
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the government to prove that less restrictive alternatives are
ineffective to further its compelling interests.53
So far, the FCC has refrained from regulating the Internet.54
Up to now, the several attempts made by Congress to regulate
indecent speech on the Internet have all failed.55 Also, the FCC
exempts broadband Internet access over cable,56 power line,57 and
" See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 815-16 (2000)
(arguing that there is "a key difference between cable television and the broadcast
media... : Cable systems have the capacity to block unwanted channels on a
household-by-household basis"); cf Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d
654, 672-88 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Edwards, J., dissenting) (arguing that no reasonable
basis can be found to distinguish broadcast from cable). But see Denver Area Educ.
Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 742 (1996) (holding
constitutional a provision permitting cable operators to prohibit indecent
programming on leased access channels, a provision requiring segregating and
blocking of indecent programming on leased access channels, and a provision
permitting cable operators to prohibit patently offensive or indecent programming
on public access channels).
" In the absence of a coherent regulatory framework of the FCC, the regulation
of the Internet is left to the courts. See, e.g., EBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc.,
100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (granting a preliminary injunction
preventing Bidder's Edge from accessing EBay's computer system by use of any
automated querying program without plaintiffs written authorization);
Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV 99-7654 HLH, 2000 WL 525390, at
*1345-46 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000) (holding that Ticketmaster failed to show harm
done by Tickets.com's spiders and software in its computers); Thomas v. Network
Solutions, Inc., 176 F.3d 500, 510-11 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that domain name
registration services are not a governmental service); CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber
Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1017 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (holding that defendants'
unsolicited commercial e-mails-spam--constitute trespass to chattels); see also
Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet Backbones 9 (FCC
Office of Plans and Policy, OPP Working Paper No. 32, 2000) (explaining why
Internet backbone services should remain unregulated), available at http:l!
www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/oppwp32.pdf.
" The U.S. Supreme Court has struck down the Communications Decency Act
of 1996 ("CDA"), 47 U.S.C.A. § 223 (West 2006), in Reno v. American Civil Liberties
Union, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997), and the Child Online Protection Act ("COPA'),
47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000), in Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656,
673 (2004), as violating the First Amendment. But see United States v. Am. Library
Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2003) (holding that the Children's Internet Protection Act
("CIPA"), requiring libraries to install filter software when providing Internet access,
does not violate the First Amendment).
6 See In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over
Wireless Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986, 14988 (2005). But see Nat'l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (sustaining the
FCC's initial distinction between Internet access through DSL technology and
Internet through cable service after companies offering DSL had been required to
make their wires available to competing Internet service providers).
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DSL 8 from mandatory common-carrier regulation under Title II
of the Communications Act; these services, therefore, are
regulated lightly and in a technology neutral manner.
Of all media, the press probably faces the fewest restrictions.
Still, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged the emergence of
large newspaper corporations, as a result of which the power to
inform the American people and to shape public opinion is placed
in only a few hands.59 This has led to a market structure similar
to the structure formed by traditional broadcast networks.
Theoretically, newspaper concentration-and scarcity in outlets
to inform the public-would provide a rationale for regulation
analogous to broadcasting. The U.S. Supreme Court, however,
rejected intervention based on scarcity of print media outlets: "A
responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press
responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like many
other virtues it cannot be legislated."60
In sum, the U.S. Supreme Court has accepted the protection
of diversity-as equivalent to scarcity-as sufficient justification
to limit the First Amendment rights of some speakers in order to
give room for other speakers. Any regulation of audiovisual
services in general needs to show that it is able to increase the
total amount of available speech.6' With regard to audiovisual
services transmitted via the Internet, a government might have
difficulties in showing that its regulatory framework serves the
goal of diversity. There is probably no platform that is as easily
accessible for speakers than the Internet. Political science
suggests that the government needs to prove that its regulatory
framework improves diversity beyond the current regime, and it
57 See In re United Power Line Council's Petition for Declaratory Ruling
Regarding the Classification of Broadband over Power Line Internet Access Service
as an Information Service, 21 F.C.C.R. 13281, 13281, 13285 (2006).
58 See id. at 13282, 13286.
'9 See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1974) (holding
unconstitutional, under the First Amendment's guarantee of a free press, Florida's
"right of reply").
60 Id. at 256.
61 Cf. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 226 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) ("I do not deny that the compulsory carriage ... extracts a serious First
Amendment price.... This price amounts to a 'suppression of speech.' But there are
important First Amendment interests on the other side as well."); Associated Press
v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) ("[The First] Amendment rests on the
assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public .... ").
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needs to show that the improvement in diversity justifies the
possible harm to other goals and the cost of regulation.
62
B. Culture
Culture" manifests itself in such places as music, literature,
painting, theater, and film.' TV provides one platform to convey
these cultural manifestations or expressions to a large audience.
TV serves, as a consequence, to promote culture. When
establishing the Corporation for Public Broadcasting ("CPB") in
the United States, Congress declared that "it is in the public
interest to encourage.., the use of such media for instructional,
educational, and cultural purposes."65 The mere formation of the
CPB implies that public service broadcasting is expected to serve
different cultural purposes than private broadcasting. Such
different cultural purposes are served, for example, by developing
"programming that involves creative risks,"66 and addressing
"national concerns and solv[ing] local problems through
community programs and outreach programs."67
Individual expressions of culture vary from community to
community, from state to state, and from nation to nation. We
may assume that this variety of individual cultural expressions is
a result of the distinctive cultural needs of a particular social
group. Therefore, regulators do not aim to protect a single
American culture as such, but seek to maintain a level of cultural
diversity. The FCC's licensing standards 68 and media ownership
62 See Turner Broad. Sys., 520 U.S. at 226-27 (Breyer, J., concurring in part)
(balancing between "speech-restricting and speech-enhancing consequences"); see
also Owen, supra note 19, at 677 (arguing that "[firee markets are an inferior choice
when they are so imperfect that even flawed regulation produces better results").
I The term "culture" lacks clear boundaries; a stringent, categorical definition;
and a corresponding, widely-accepted catalogue of expected functions. See, e.g.,
Werner Fuchs-Heinritz, Kultur [Culture], in LEXIKON ZUR SOZIOLOGIE
[ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIOLOGY] 379 (Werner Fuchs-Heinritz et al. eds., 3d ed. 1994);
Lyn Spillman, Culture, in THE BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIOLOGY 922
(Georg Ritzer ed., 2007); see also JEFFREY KENNETH HASS, ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY:
AN INTRODUCTION 9 (2007). This Article will, therefore, refrain from defining the
term "culture."
See Spillman, supra note 63, at 926-27.
47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
Id. § 396(a)(6).
6' Id. § 396(a)(7).
' See infra Part II.B.
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rules, 69 both promoting localism, might be regarded as efforts to
protect local culture.7"
There is no reason why the production of cultural products
should not obey market forces. Due to market forces, any given
shortfall of domestically produced culture will be compensated by
cultural expressions produced abroad, assuming overall demand
for cultural products remains unchanged. The reasons for such
expansion of foreign culture probably vary and shall not be
discussed here.7' Like falling domestic production in other
industries, a perceived shortfall of domestic cultural production
will capture domestic public interest and easily find a place on
the agenda of domestic governments. 2  Governments may
regulate TV stations as an instrument to promote individual
cultural expressions in general. For the reasons explained above,
a government is most likely to focus on promoting domestically
produced cultural expressions.73 In order to promote domestic
culture, however, a nation also will have to change the
established consumption pattern and will have to shift the ratio
between consumption of foreign and domestic culture.
The promotion of culture and, in particular, cultural
diversity is an important public interest. Unlike other countries'
69 See infra Part II.C.
70 Cf Kevin Martin, FCC Chairman, Statement at Public Hearing on Localism
(Oct. 31, 2007), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs public/attachmatch/DOC-
277762Al.pdf. For localism as a guiding principle for policy decisions, see generally
Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 346 (1990) (noting that local values "pervade the system and make state
legislatures and courts resistant to altering these arrangements in ways that would
undermine local independence"); Philip M. Napoli, supra note 14, at 801-02.
11 Foreign culture, e.g. Hollywood films in Europe, may have more appeal for
different reasons. Foreign production standards may outclass domestic ones, foreign
culture may be produced en masse and, as a consequence, may be sold cheaper than
domestic products, or domestic production may just be too small to meet demand.
72 See, e.g., Leslie Wayne, U.S.-Europe Team Beats Out Boeing on Big Contract,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2008, at Al (describing the outrage of the Washington State
delegation in Congress when a forty billion dollar contract for aerial refueling
tankers was awarded to Airbus instead of Boeing).
71 This is including, at best, the promotion of "cultural dialogue" or
"interculturality." For the concept of "cultural dialogue," see Juirgen Habermas,
Multiculturalism and the Liberal State, 47 STAN. L. REV. 849, 849 (1995). UNESCO
defines "interculturality" as "the existence and equitable interaction of diverse
cultures and the possibility of generating shared cultural expressions through
dialogue and mutual respect." U.N. Educ., Sci. & Cultural Org. [UNESCO],
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural
Expressions, pt. III, art. 4, T 8 (Oct. 20, 2005) [hereinafter UNESCO Convention],
available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001429/142919e.pdf.
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constitutions, the U.S. Constitution does not address the cultural
responsibilities of the state. 74  Despite this omission, and
although the United States is home to so many ethnic groups,
most would not deny the existence of a unique "American
Culture" or a unique "American way of life." Such American
Culture would be distinguishable from other cultures on other
continents and from the way of life in other nations. The
preservation of "Culture" and "Cultural Diversity" is a goal of
several international, federal, and state policies. A whole
chapter of the United States Code deals with American Folklife
Preservation.75 Public funds support a wide range of cultural
activities. 76  The protection and promotion of the diversity of
cultural expressions is the sole objective of a UNESCO
Convention, which entered into force on March 18, 2007.77
There is no standard instrument for promoting cultural
diversity. To pursue policy goals, governments have various
policy instruments at their disposal, such as regulation,
74 The lack of cultural responsibilities in the U.S. Constitution is contrasted
by other constitutions, which often contain cultural goals. See, e.g., Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.),
available at http'//laws.justice.gc.ca/en/Charter/index.html; Bundesverfassung der
Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft [BVI, Constitution fed~rale de la Confederation
suisse [Cst] [Constitution] April 18, 1999, SR 101, RO 101, art. 2, (Switz.),
translation available at http://www.admin.clorg/polit/O0083/index.html?lang=en. As
one of its goals, the European Union is charged to "contribute to the flowering of the
cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity
and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore." See Treaty
Establishing the European Community art. 151, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C321) 113.
75 20 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2144 (2000). Section 2101 states:
Congress hereby finds and declares (1) that the diversity inherent in
American folklife has contributed greatly to the cultural richness of the
Nation and has fostered a sense of individuality and identity among the
American people; (2) that the history of the United States effectively
demonstrates that building a strong nation does not require the sacrifice of
cultural differences ....
Id. § 2101.
76 See, e.g., New York City Department of Cultural Affairs, About Cultural
Affairs, http'//home2.nyc.gov/htm]dcla/html/about/about.shtml (last visited Nov. 2,
2008).
77 See UNESCO Convention, supra note 73. The Convention was not approved
or adopted by the United States. For a list of the current member states, see
UNESCO.org, Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity
of Cultural Expressions, http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=31038&
language=E&order=alpha (last visited Nov. 2, 2008).
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contracting, corrective taxes, and grants.7" Policy instruments
vary in intrusiveness with regard to TV stations' ability to
operate freely, consumers' freedom to consume their preferred
cultural products, and the instruments' effect on international
trade in cultural products. 79 By regulating broadcast and cable
in order to promote domestic culture, a government chooses a
rather more intrusive government tool compared to subsidizing
domestic artists, for example." Direct regulation of content
broadcast (for example, by imposing a culture quota), however,
might be much more effective than mere financial incentives for
producers and distributors of content. This Article aims to
explore the impact and effectiveness of the policy instruments
used by governments in audiovisual media. As will be discussed
in detail below," European regulation promoting culture would
raise the eyebrows of American Supreme Court Justices.
C. Quality
In addition to the claim that private programmers do not
care to preserve cultural diversity, some commentators argue
that private media generally produce programs of little
educational and cultural value. 2 "Even if the market could give
consumers exactly what they wanted, the media would not
necessarily deliver what a strong democracy and civil society
needs in terms of exposure to diversity, the forging of solidarity,
and elevation outside of market exchanges." 3 Thus, media
markets are deemed to work imperfectly, producing undesired
equilibria. This general lack of-broadly speaking-"quality" is
" See Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action:
An Introduction, in The TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT 1, 4 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002).
19 See id. at 25-26.
"o See id.
81 See infra Part II.
82 See Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy Out of the Box: Content Abundance,
Attention Scarcity, and the Failures of Digital Markets, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1389, 1418 (2004) (citing the Chairman of the Parents Television Council, who had
described TV offerings as "raw sewage").
83 Id. at 1455. See also 2 THEODOR W. ADORNO, Prolog zum Fernsehen [Prologue
to Television], in KULTURKRITIK UND GESELLSCHAFT [CULTURE CRITIQUE AND
SOCIETY] 507, 512 (RolfTiedemann ed., 2003) (arguing that TV estranges people and
replaces social interaction, and as a consequence, TV makes people dumber,
although the broadcasted content is not dumber than other consumed cultural
goods); Baker, supra note 12, at 313-15 (arguing that the audience would prefer
higher quality video products if given the choice, that is, if markets would work
perfectly).
20081 1463
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
regarded as another reason for interventionist media pol,
justifying, for example, the Children's Television Act of 1990.s'
One could argue that the audience itself, faced with huge
transaction costs, is unable to coordinate and to carry out
negotiations with broadcasters on improving the quality of
programming. The quality argument also connects audiovisual
media with the notion of "merit goods"8 5 (or "public goods,"
assuming that some superior programming would not be
produced by private markets at all). 6 The concept of "merit
goods" acknowledges that the market is theoretically able to
provide the collectively desired goods merit wants. These goods,
however, "are considered so meritorious that their satisfaction
must be provided for through the public budget, over and above
any market provision that individuals may wish to make."8"
Intervention in markets based on the merit good rationale
overrides individual consumption decisions. Richard Musgrave
explains this defiance of consumer sovereignty by the emergence
of certain situations, in the context of a democratic community,
where an informed group considers itself justified in imposing its
decisions upon others. 8 Legislators and regulators, supposedly
the "informed groups" here, regard certain types of programming
as superior per se, and consequently prefer local and public
service programmers to commercial programmers.8 9  Why
legislators and regulators should be better able to judge quality
than the audience itself still needs to be explained. Even if one
assumes that today's media markets work inefficiently, produce
inferior quality work, and produce negative externalities on
' Pub. L. No. 101-437, § 102, 104 Stat. 996 (1990) (codified at
47 U.S.C. §§ 303(a)-(b) (2000)). This act aims to increase the amount of educational
and informational programming for children on TV. Each broadcast TV station in
the United States is required to serve the needs of children through its overall
programming, including programming specifically designed to serve their needs. The
act limits the amount of advertisements permitted during children's programs. Id.
s See Goodman; supra note 82, at 1414.
s See Baker, supra note 12, at 322-29 (arguing that content bears
characteristics of public good). Baker's argument, however, applies only to free-to-air
broadcasting. A public good is determined by non-rivalry of and non-excludability
from consumption. Today, there are ample technological possibilities to exclude free-
riders from the consumption of content-cable systems, on-demand video-rendering
content a private good, which markets are able to provide for. Id.
", Jack Wiseman, The Public Economy, 27 ECONOMICA 258, 261 (1960).
88 See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A STUDY IN
PUBLIC ECONOMY 14 (1959).
89 See infra Parts II.A-B.
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democratic values, 90  replacing market mechanisms with
government schemes can only be justified if better performance
results. 91
Early U.S. Supreme Court decisions raise the idea that
licensees of airwaves act as public trustees. As such, they "must
present representative community views and voices on
controversial issues which are of importance to [their]
listeners. 92  The concept of public trustees implies that the
spectrum is owned by the public. Governments naturally regard
themselves as representatives of the public. Public ownership
would give them a say on how the spectrum should be put in use.
It supports the idea that broadcasters are not meant to align
their programming solely with market forces, but also with the
needs of society. Public ownership of spectrum, however, would
also "bring[] into play the First Amendment, which requires that
governmental authority may not be used in and of itself to justify
deprivation of freedoms of speech and press."93 Thus, the claim of
90 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 12, at 414-15 (arguing that, beyond subsidies,
policies directed at encouraging the allocation of control over content creation to
people with commitments to quality rather than merely to the bottom line would
make media entities more responsive to the market); Cass R. Sunstein, Television
and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV. 499, 502-04 (2000) (arguing that public
interest requirements for broadcasters still make sense where channels abound, that
the concept of consumer-sovereignty is ill-suited to communications markets, and
that an unregulated media market cannot promote the aspiration to deliberative
democracy).
9" See REN9 L. FREY, WIRTSCHAFT, STAAT UND WOHLFAHRT [ECONOMY, STATE
AND WELFARE] 238-40 (11th ed. 2002) (arguing that state interventions in order to
correct market failure may result in government failure); VALLENDER ET AL., supra
note 33, at 286-88; JOE WALLIS & BRIAN DOLLERY, MARKET FAILURE, GOVERNMENT
FAILURE, LEADERSHIP AND PUBLIC POLICY 32 (1999) (discussing the problems and
costs of government intervention and possible government failures); Colin Robinson,
Introduction to ARTHUR SELDON, GOVERNMENT FAILURE AND OVER-GOVERNMENT,
at ix, xiii (Colin Robinson ed., 2005) (emphasizing the supremacy of market forces
over governmental power).
92 Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 111-12
(1973); see also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969); N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Leflore Broad. Co. v. FCC, 636 F.2d 454,
461 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (emphasizing "the special status of licensees as trustees of a
scarce public resource").
93 Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
see Radio Television News Dirs. Ass'n v. United States, 400 F.2d 1002, 1019 (7th Cir.
1968); BERRESFORD, supra note 3, at 18-19 (pointing out that 47 U.S.C. § 301
provides the United States with control of all channels, but not with ownership and
further emphasizing that licensees may be granted use but not ownership of such
channels). Governments in Europe have not assumed ownership of spectrum, but
have secured themselves the right to regulate the use of spectrum. See Grundgesetz
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public ownership does not seem to help legislators in pursuing
their goal of improving quality in broadcasting beyond the
narrow limits set by the First Amendment.
Limiting First Amendment rights of broadcasters has been
justified by the protection of the privacy of the home, in
particular the protection of minors from indecent or obscene
broadcasting.9 4  In contrast to bookstores or movie theaters,
where young people's access to offensive speech may be blocked
without interfering with content, broadcast is deemed too easily
accessible for children. 5 The powers of the government to
impose such content-based restrictions on programmers,
however, are limited. With regard to programming on cable
systems, parents are expected to request the blocking of indecent
programming in order to protect their children.96 With regard to
the Internet, restrictions at the source seem out of the question
even where minors are to be protected.9
II. CURRENT STRATEGIES FOR ACHIEVING DIVERSITY AND
PRESERVING CULTURE
Public service broadcasters, licensing regimes, ownership
limits, behavioral restraints, promotion of domestic culture,
must-carry requirements, rules on anti-siphoning, and subsidies
are the most common regulatory instruments for achieving
diversity and preserving culture. Applied with alternating
ffir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Basic Law] May 23, 1949,
Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl.] 2002 I S. 2862-63, art. 73(7) (F.R.G.); Bundesverfassung
der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft [BV], Constitution f~ed~rale de la
Conf6deration suisse [Cst] [Constitution] April 18, 1999, SR 101, RO 101, art. 92
(Switz.), available at http'//www.admin.ch/org/polit/00083/index.html?lang=en.
" See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978). After the 2004
Super Bowl incident involving Janet Jackson, Congress even increased indecency
fines by enacting the Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2005. Pub. L. No. 109-
235, 120 Stat. 491 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.A. § 503(b)(2) (West 2008)). For
a similar discussion concerning Europe, see Bundesgericht [BGer [Federal Court]
May 3, 2007, 133 Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts [BGE] II
136, 141-46 (Switz.) (discussing the limits to indecent programming in the European
Union and Switzerland).
" See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49.
' See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000).
The signals in question had been scrambled by cable operators; however, "signal
bleed" resulted in the leaking of portions of the program. Id. at 806; see also
Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954, 959-60 (8th
Cir. 2003) ("IT]he government cannot silence protected speech [such as violent video
games] by wrapping itself in the cloak of parental authority.").
97 f. supra note 55.
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eagerness, these instruments have found the approval of
regulators on both sides of the Atlantic. This Part highlights the
key characteristics of American and European broadcast
regulation. Since most European broadcast regulation is
concretized on member state level, references to German
broadcast regulation will serve to complete the picture. As this
Part will show, American and European (in particular, German)
broadcast regulations both center on the fundamental right of
freedom of speech, as guaranteed by the First Amendment and
article 5 of the German Constitution,98 respectively.
A. Public Service Broadcasters
Shortly after broadcasting first became established as a new
media in Europe, it was abused by the Nazis for propaganda
purposes. The nationalization and abuse of radio by the Nazis
seems to suggest that government-sponsored broadcasting is not
the best way to achieve diversity of opinions.99 Thus, the
formation of strong public service broadcasters in Europe,
starting after World War II, comes as a surprise. Strong public
service broadcasters have been established in the United
Kingdom (BBC), Germany (ARD, ZDF), France (France
T6 l6visions), Italy (Radiotelevisione Italiana), Austria (ORF), and
Switzerland (SRG SSR idde suisse). In most of these countries,
public service broadcasters have at their disposal quite a
number, if not the majority, of available broadcast channels.
Public service broadcasting in the United States is
subsidized by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting ("CPB"), a
corporation established by the Public Broadcasting Act in
November 7, 1967.100 The purpose of the CPB is to "facilitate the
full development of public telecommunications in which
programs of high quality, diversity, creativity, excellence and
innovation ... will be made available to public.., entities."10 1
98 See Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GGI [Basic Law] May
23, 1949, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1.] 2002 1 S. 2862-63, art. 5(1) (F.R.G.).
9 See, for example, the efforts of Justice Murphy in restraining the power of the
government over radio in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States. 319 U.S. 190,
228 (1943) ("Events in Europe show that radio may readily be a weapon of authority
and misrepresentation, instead of a means of entertainment and enlightenment. It
may even be an instrument of oppression.").
100 Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365, 369 (1967)
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 396 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
101 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A).
20081 1467
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
All nine members of the Board of Directors of the CPB are
appointed by the President. 10 2  Thus, although the CPB is
declared not to "be an agency or establishment of the United
States Government,"1°3 the President's power to appoint all
Directors throws doubt on the private nature of the CPB.'14 The
CPB provides funding to the Public Broadcasting Service ("PBS")
and National Public Radio ("NPR") and to other local public TV
and radio stations that are members of PBS or NPR, as well as to
independent broadcasters. In more recent years, the CPB has
started funding Internet-based projects.10 5 Most public interest
programming is produced by PBS and NPR, which are private
non-profit corporations owned by member stations that receive
and broadcast the programming.10 6 PBS averaged a modest 1.4%
primetime rating during the 2006-2007 season.0
Public service broadcasters in Germany have been
established as agencies of the government. 0 8 They must provide
a basic TV service, which the German Constitutional Court
construed as a constitutional right based on Free Speech.109 This
constitutional right secures public service broadcasting as such
and includes a right to develop and to grow (Bestandes- und
Entwicklungsgarantie).110  As a consequence, public service
102 Id. § 396(c)(1).
103 Id. § 396(b).
'0o See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 391 (1995) (holding
that Amtrak is a state actor); see also Peter Hettich, Governance by Mutual
Benchmarking: How State-Owned Enterprises May Induce Private Actors to Observe
Policy Goals, 32 U. DAYTON L. REV. 199, 212-14 (2007).
105 See CORP. FOR PUB. BROAD., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 12 (2007), available at
http://www.cpb.org/aboutcpb/reports/annual/cpb_2006_annualreport.pdf.
106 See National Public Radio, About NPR, http//www.npr.org/about (last visited
Nov. 2, 2008); About PBS: Corporate Facts, supra note 7.
107 See CORP. FOR PUB. BROAD., supra note 105.
10" See HUBERTUS GERSDORF, GRUNDZUGE DES RUNDFUNKRECHTS: NATIONALER
UND EUROPAISCHER REGULIERUNGSRAHMEN [BASICS OF BROADCASTING LAw] 133
(2003).
109 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb.
28, 1961, 12 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 205 (
262-63), translation available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/
transnational/work-new/german/case.php?id=652.
110 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court],
Sept. 11, 2007, 1 BvR 2270/05 ( 123), Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal
Constitutional Court] Feb. 5, 1991, 83 Entscheidungen des Bundes-
verfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 238 (297) (F.R.G.); Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 24, 1987, 74 Entscheidungen des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 297 (350) (F.R.G.), translation available at
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broadcasters have a constitutional right to access appropriate
distribution platforms (spectrum, as well as--even if in addition
to the basic service-other platforms like cable, satellite and
Internet). They have to honor this right by providing diverse and
balanced programming."1  The constitutional right of Free
Speech precludes not only political meddling in programming,
1 2
but also effective supervision by the government. If the law is
violated, supervising authorities are supposed to notify public
service broadcasters, but enforcement orders may be issued only
if the violation is not remedied in due time. 1 3 The operational
efficiency of public service broadcasters is subject to a yearly
assessment,1 1 4 but lack of efficiency may not be sanctioned.
1 15
Several internal bodies within a public service broadcaster are
responsible for supervision. A council with representatives of all
"relevant" groups in society (Rundfunkrat) is the guardian of
public interest, elects the managing director of the broadcaster
(Intendant), as well as approves the budget and drafts the
guiding principles of programming.1 6 The managing director is
http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/
work-new/german/case.php?id=635.
"' See BVerfG, Sept. 11, 2007, 1 BvR 2270/05 ( 123); BVerfG Mar. 24, 1987, 74
BVerfGE 297 (326) (F.R.G.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal
Constitutional Court] Nov. 4, 1986, 73 Entscheidungen des Bundes
verfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 118 (157-58) (F.R.G.) (describing the functions of
public broadcasting); see also Rundfunkstaatsvertrag [Interstate Broadcast Treaty],
Aug. 31, 1991, amended by Vertrag, Dec. 19, 2007, § 19a [hereinafter Interstate
Broadcast Treaty], http://www.br-online.de/content/cms/Universalseite/2008/03/06/
cumulus/BR-online-Publikation--189888-20080828132017.pdf, translation available
at http://www.alm.de/fileadminEnglisch/9_RAEStV_- Englisch.pdf; Council Directive
89/552, art. 19, 1989 O.J. (L298) 23 (EC), amended by Council Directive 1997/36,
1997 O.J. (L202) 60 (EC), and Council Directive 2007/65, 2007 O.J. (L332) 27 (EC).
12 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June
16, 1981, 57 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 295 (320)
(F.R.G.), translation available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/
transnational/work new/german/case.php?id=6 4 1; BVerfG, Feb. 28, 1961, 12
BVerfGE 205 (261) (F.R.G.); see also GERSDORF, supra note 108, at 157-58.
113 ZDF-Staatsvertrag [Treaty on the Formation of the Second German
Television], Aug. 31, 1991, § 31, amended by Vertrag, Mar. 1, 2007; Gesetz iber den
Westdeutschen Rundfunk Koln [WDR-Gesetz] [State Act on the Broadcaster of
Western Germany], Mar. 23, 1985, § 54, available at http://www.wdr.del
unternehmenLmedia/pdf/basisstruktur/wdrGesetzneu.pdf; see also WOLFGANG
HOFFMANN-RIEM, REGULATING MEDIA 124-25 (1996).
114 ZDF Staatsvertrag, § 30; WDR-Gesetz, § 42.
115 See GERSDORF, supra note 108, at 158-59.
116 See ZDF-Staatsvertrag, §§ 20, 24, 26; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG]
[Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 5, 1991, 83 Entscheidungen des
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responsible for programming, leaving the council with hardly any
powers to interfere. 117 A Board of Directors (Verwaltungsrat) is
responsible for the supervision of the business and technical
aspects of operations.1 ' In 2007, the two largest public
broadcasters held a market share of 13.4% and 12.8%,
respectively, still unbeaten even by the large private
broadcasters (RTL: 12.5%, Sat.1: 9.6%, ProSieben: 6.5%, Vox:
5.7%).119 Large public service broadcasters on regional levels
held an aggregated share of 13.3%.12 The largest Swiss public
TV broadcaster, for the sake of comparison, held a market share
of 33.5%.121 The main public broadcasters in France, under the
roof of France T6lvisions, held a share of 34.9% of the French
audience; in Italy, RAI held even 43.6%.122
Although charged with the same task of promoting cultural
diversity, public service broadcasters in the United States and in
Europe serve different roles. Looking at current market shares
in the United States, public service broadcasting is expected to
fill a gap neglected by private TV stations. Its programming is
supposed to supplement private offerings. In contrast, in Europe,
one of the principal sources of information for the public are
public service broadcasters. They hold a strong position and
compete with private broadcasters with a similar selection of
programs (feature films, sports, news, sitcoms, etc.). 123 European
governments argue that only strong public service broadcasting
succeeds in fulfilling cultural, social, and democratic functions,
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 238 (326) (F.R.G.); HOFFMANN-RIEM, supra
note 113, at 123-24; see also GERSDORF, supra note 108, at 145-47.
117 See ZDF-Staatsvertrag, §§ 20, 27; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG]
[Federal Constitutional Court] Nov. 4, 1986, 73 Entscheidungen des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 118 (170) (F.R.G.); see also GERSDORF, supra
note 108, at 147, 150.
118 ZDF-Staatsvertrag, §§ 23, 28; WDR-Gesetz, § 21.
119 See Quoten von ARD und ZDF Stirzen auf Historisches Tief [Audience of
ARD and ZDF Drops to Historic Low], SPIEGEL ONLINE (F.R.G.), Dec. 15, 2007,
http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/0, 1518,523550,00.html.
120 Id.
121 See Schweizer Fernsehen Verliert Marktanteile [Swiss Public Broadcaster
Loses Market Shares], TAGES-ANZEIGER (Switz.), Jan. 10, 2008, http://tages-
anzeiger.ch/dyn/news/schweiz/830527.html.
122 See FRANCE TPL8VISIONS, RAPPORT ANNUELLE 2006 [ANNUAL REPORT 20061
11 (2007), available at http://www.francetelevisions.fr/downloads/rapportannuel_
2006.pdf; RAI, Bilanzio 2005 [Financial Statements 20051, http://www.bilancio2005.
rai.it/ita/bilancio/index.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2008).
12 See infra note 273.
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and is capable of providing information, culture, education, and
entertainment to the whole of society, thereby enhancing social,
political, and cultural citizenship and stimulating the cohesion of
society.124 Public service broadcasting needs independence from
state actors in order to fulfill these functions. 125 A latent threat
to independence is state supervision and dependence on public
funding. Monitoring and the power to cut funding, however, are
also required to punish incompetence and waste. The line
between legitimate monitoring and political meddling is easily
crossed. One of the most extreme examples of "abuse" of public
service broadcasters in post-communist times was provided by
Italy's Silvio Berlusconi, a media mogul controlling most Italian
private TV stations. Whilst serving as Prime Minister of Italy,
he gained indirect control of Italy's public service broadcaster
RAI, sacking two of their journalists after they criticized him. 26
Privately owned broadcast stations, of course, are similarly
vulnerable to air their owners' propaganda.
B. Licenses
After the FCC 127 was allowed to assume control over
spectrum in 1927,128 the airwaves got licensed on the basis of
public interest, convenience, or necessity. 129  This criterion is,
according to the U.S. Supreme Court, "as concrete as the
complicated factors for judgment in such a field of delegated
124 See Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments
of the Member States, 1999 O.J. (C 30) 1 (EU); Eur. Parl. Ass., Comm. on Culture,
Sci. and Educ., Report on Public Service Broadcasting, 10th Sess., Doc. No. 10029
(2004), available at http-//assembly.coe.int/main.asp?link=/Documents/Working
Docs/docO4fEDOC 10029.htm.
122 See Yvo Hangartner, Unabhdngigkeit vom Staat und von staatlichen
Unternehmen als Voraussetzung der Medienfreiheit [Independence from the State
and State-Owned-Enterprises as Precondition of Freedom of Media], 14 AJP/PJA
1183, 1185-86 (2005).
126 See Peter Popham, Berlusconi Attacks Italy's Last Bastion of Independent
Television, INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 16, 2006, at 22.
127 In 1927, Congress established the Federal Radio Commission. H.R. 9971,
69th Cong. § 3-4, 44 Stat. 1162-64 (1927).
128 With the Congressional Mandate, the chaos created by Hoover v. Intercity
Radio Co., 286 F. 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that the issuance of a license for
broadcasting is a ministerial duty), and United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d
614, 618-19 (N.D. Ill. 1926) (holding that the Government has no power to regulate
frequencies, power, and time of a station), was brought to an end. But see Tribune
Co. v. Oak Leaves Broad. Station, 68 CONG. REC. 215, 216-19 (Cir. Ct. Cook County
Ill. Nov. 17, 1926).
129 See 47 U.S.C. § 303(f) (2000).
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authority permit."3 ' Traditionally, the FCC decided on
applications by way of comparative hearings, taking into account
financial and engineering capabilities, minority interests, and
diversity considerations when issuing a broadcast license. 131 The
ban of foreign governments and non-citizens to assume
ownership of a radio or TV station, however, is absolute.'32
Broadcasts from foreign countries are not regulated by the FCC;
they may be received via Internet ("IPTV"), subject to approval of
the holders of the intellectual property rights concerned. No
applications for new TV stations will be accepted by the FCC
until 2009, when it is expected that the conversion from analog to
digital broadcasting will be complete. 33 New applications for
commercial broadcasting will be subject to broadcast auctions.3
Applications for channels reserved for noncommercial
educational stations will be assessed by a point system. 35
European Union Law does not deal with the licensing of
broadcasters. On a European level, the European Court of
Human Rights has held that member states may not reserve
licenses exclusively to public service broadcasters. 36 Setting a
minimum standard, both the Audiovisual Media Services
Directive as well as the preceding Television without Frontiers
Directive merely require the member states to allow broadcasts
originating from other member states into their territory without
asking for a license.137  The member states, Germany, for
130 FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
131 See FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N MEDIA BUREAU, THE PUBLIC AND
BROADCASTING: How TO GET THE MOST SERVICE FROM YOUR LOCAL STATION 7-8
(2008), available at http://www.fcc.gov/mb/audio/decdoc/public-andbroadcasting.
html.
132 47 U.S.C. § 310(a)-(b) (2000).
133 See FCC Audio Division, How To Apply for a Broadcast Station,
http://www.fcc.gov/mb/audio/howtoapply.html (Last Visited Nov. 2, 2008).
134 Id. Congress requires the FCC to use auctions to resolve mutually exclusive
applications for initial licenses. Exemptions apply, inter alia, for digital TV licenses
to replace analog licenses and noncommercial educational and public broadcast
stations. 47 U.S.C.A. § 309(j)(1)-(2) (West 2006).
131 See In re Reexamination of the Comparative Standards for Noncommercial
Educational Applicants, 15 F.C.C.R. 7386, 7387-88 (2000), available at
http://ljallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-00-120Al.pdf (the point system
still relies on criteria like local diversity, state-wide network, technical parameters,
and local establishment).
136 See Informationsverein Lentia v. Austria, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 93, 93
(1993).
137 See Council Directive 89/552, art. 2a, 1989 O.J. (L 298) 23 (EC), amended by
Council Directive 1997/36, 1997 O.J. (L202) 60 (EC), and Council Directive 2007/65,
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example, have implemented complex provisions for licensing
domestic private broadcasters, while public service broadcasters
benefit from statutory licenses. 138  In Germany, licenses are
issued by independent regulators on the state level
(Landesmedienanstalten).139  The Landesmedienanstalten are
also competent to supervise programming. 40  From September
2008, a central authority (Kommission fdr Zulassung und
Aufsicht) will finally be able to issue licenses for the whole of
Germany.1 41  Applicants have to prove their ability to provide an
adequate service level.142  Members of state or the federal
2007 O.J. (L332) 27 (EC). The Directive, whose intended purpose is to facilitate
broadcasts between member states of the European Union, does not contain
substantive provisions for broadcasts from third countries. The directive, however, is
applicable to media service providers whose head office or a significant part of their
workforce is in a member state or to media service providers using a satellite up-link
or satellite capacity of a member state. See id. art. 2(3)(c). No provision of the
Directive prevents a member state of the European Union from establishing
jurisdiction over foreign broadcasts distributed over IPTV; such transmission via
IPTV, however, may have their origin and may be received anywhere. According to
the Directive, E.U. law shall not apply to audiovisual media services, which are
intended exclusively for reception in third countries and which are not received with
standard consumer equipment. Id. art. 2(6). The absence of any limits to a
government's jurisdiction over IPTV is astonishing. No international standards have
been established in this regard, with the possible exception of regional conventions
like the European Convention on Transfrontier Television or the international
convention of 1936 on the use of broadcasting for the promotion of peace, the latter
banning the use of programs for propaganda and warmongering. See European
Convention on Transfrontier Television art. 5, May 5, 1989, 132 Europ. T.S.,
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/132.htm;
International Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace
arts. 1-2, Sept. 23, 1936, 186 L.N.T.S. 301.
13s See Interstate Broadcast Treaty, supra note 111, § 19.
139 See id. § 20; see also Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal
Constitutional Court] Nov. 4, 1986, 73 Entscheidungen des Bundes-
verfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 118 (125); GERSDORF, supra note 108, at 163-64.
140 See Interstate Broadcast Treaty, supra note 111, § 35; see also GERSDORF,
supra note 108, at 162-63, 175-83.
141 Interstate Broadcast Treaty, supra note 111, §§ 35-36.
142 Id. § 20a(1); Landesmediengesetz Baden-Wuirttemberg (LMedienG) [Media
Law of Baden-Wirttemberg], July 19, 1999, GB1. Baden-Wuirttemberg at 273,
amended by Feb. 14, 2007, GB1. Baden-Wirttemberg at 108, § 13 [hereinafter Media
Law of Baden-Wuirttemberg]; Bayerisches Mediengesetz (BayMG) [Bavarian Media
Law], Oct. 22, 2003, GVB1. Bayern at 799, amended by Gesetz, Dec. 11, 2007, GVB1.
Bayern at 1008, art. 24, 26 [hereinafter Bavarian Media Law]; Landesmediengesetz
Nordrhein-Westfalen (LMG NRW) [Media Law of North Rhine-Westphalia], last
amended by Gesetz, June 29, 2007, GV. NRW at 192, § 5 [hereinafter Media Law of
North Rhine-Westphalia].
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governments may not apply for licenses. 4 3 The programming of
TV stations must promote diversity, in particular cultural
diversity. All major forces shaping public opinion (e.g., religious
groups, political parties) must be heard.'" Most states in
Germany are satisfied if TV stations achieve diversity of opinions
on an aggregate level. 4 ' Some states, however, insist that each
individual broadcaster meet the criterion of diverse
programming. 146 The German Constitutional Court accepts both
models as constitutional, 147 holding that diversity standards may
only be relaxed for private broadcasters, as long as public service
broadcasters guarantee independent and diverse
programming. 148
143 Media Law of Baden-Wtirttemberg, supra note 142, § 14; Bavarian Media
Law, supra note 142, § 24; Media Law of North Rhine-Westphalia, supra note 142,
§ 6; see also BVerfG Mar. 12, 2008, 2 BvF 4/03 (holding that a total ban on political
parties holding shares in TV stations, regardless of influence, is unconstitutional);
BVerfG, Nov. 4, 1986, 73 BVerfGE 118 (124-26) (F.R.G.).
144 Media Law of Baden-Wirttemberg, supra note 142, §§ 12, 23; Bavarian
Media Law, supra note 142, §§ 4, 26; Media Law of North Rhine-Westphalia, supra
note 142, §§ 4, 31.
145 Landesrundfunkgesetz Rheinland-Pfalz (LRG RP) [Media Law of Rhineland-
Palatinate], July 28, 1992, GVB1. Rheinland-Pfalz at 247, last amended by Gesetz,
Dec. 16, 2002, GVB1. Rheinland-Pfalz at 493, § 16 [hereinafter Media Law of
Rhineland-Palatinate]; Hessisches Privatrundfunkgesetz (HPRG) [Hessian Media
Law], Jan. 25, 1995, GVB1. Hessen I at 87, last amended by Gesetz, June 5, 2007,
GVB1. Hessen I at 294, § 14 [hereinafter Hessian Media Law]; Media Law of Baden-
Wirttemberg, supra note 142, § 23; Bavarian Media Law, supra note 142, § 4.
However, German broadcasters still have to meet the criteria of objectivity and
balance at all times. See BVerfG, Nov. 4, 1986, 73 BVerfGE 118 (124-26) (F.R.G.);
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 16, 1981,
57 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 295 (325-26)
(F.R.G.); BVerfG Feb. 28, 1961, 12 BVerfGE 205 (262-63).
146 Saarlandisches Mediengesetz (SMG) [Media Law of Saarland], Feb. 27, 2002,
Amtsbl. Saarland at 498, last amended by Gesetz, Apr. 25, 2007, Amtsbl. Saarland
at 1062, § 16 [hereinafter Media Law of Saarland]; Hamburgisches Mediengesetz
(HmbMedienG) [Media Law of Hamburg], July 2, 2003, HmbGVB1. at 209, last
amended by Gesetz, Nov. 4, 2005, HmbGVBl. at 443, § 3; Bremisches
Landesmediengesetz (BremLMG) [Media Law of Bremen], Mar. 22, 2005, Brem.GB1.
at 71, § 13 [hereinafter Media Law of Bremen]; Media Law of North Rhine-
Westphalia, supra note 142, § 33.
147 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb.
5, 1991, 83 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 238 (316)
(F.R.G.); BVerfG, Nov. 4, 1986, 73 BVerfGE 118 (171) (F.R.G.).
145 See BVerfG, Feb. 5, 1991, 83 BVerfGE 238 (316) (F.R.G.);
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 24, 1987,
74 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 297 (325) (F.R.G.);
BVerfG, Nov. 4, 1986, 73 BVerfGE 118 (158) (F.R.G.); see also HOFFMANN-RIEM,
supra note 113, at 120; EMMANUEL E. PARASCHOS, MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION IN
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Diversity is best served if no available slots for broadcasting
remain unused. Thus, authorities in the United States and in
Germany have no discretion to deny a license, provided that the
applicant fulfills all statutory requirements and provided that no
other mutually exclusive application is pending. 149 With
spectrum becoming less scarce due to digital broadcasting and
with cable and the Internet providing additional platforms for
audiovisual media providers, the licensing process has lost its
significance. Market entry has become much easier for providers
of traditional TV services. Since April 2007, for example, a
provider of audiovisual media services in Switzerland does not
even need a license; the provider simply has to notify the
supervising authority when it starts operations. 150 With regard
to audiovisual media providers in general (TV-like, On-Demand
etc.), the expansion of the European regulatory framework to all
communication networks constitutes a certain threat to easy
market entry. Although the new Audiovisual Media Services
Directive does not "encourage the member states to impose new
systems of licensing or administrative authorization,"'5' member
states are free to do otherwise. A dubious public interest
rationale and the desire to protect established public service
broadcasting may induce the member states to regulate an infant
new media industry using the Internet as their platform.
C. Ownership Limits
The FCC has imposed restrictions on the ownership of
broadcast media and cable systems. The media ownership rules
encompass the national TV multiple ownership rule, 52 the local
THE EUROPEAN UNION: NATIONAL, TRANSNATIONAL, AND U.S. PERSPECTIVES 137
(1998).
149 47 C.F.R. § 73.3591(a)(1) (2007); see also GERSDORF, supra note 108, at 178.
But see Demuth v. Switzerland (No. 38743/97), 2002-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 29 (arguing
that, under conditions of scarcity, a government legitimately may reserve channel
capacity for programmers, which are better able to comply with cultural goals,
rather than giving away capacity to an applicant promoting cars).
150 See Bundesgesetz Uber Radio und Fernsehen [RTVG] [Swiss Federal Law on
Radio and Television] Mar. 24, 2006, SR 784.40, art. 3 (Switz.).
151 Council Directive 2007/65, 15, 2007 O.J. (L332) 27, 29 (EC). German Law
does not require a license to provide non-TV-like audiovisual media services, but
imposes some regulatory safeguards. See Telemediengesetz (TMG) [Telemedia Act]
Feb. 26, 2007, BGB1. I at 179, § 4.
152 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e)(1) (2008) (limiting national TV ownership to a
maximum aggregate national audience reach of thirty-nine percent, as directed by
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TV multiple ownership rule,15 3 the radio/TV cross-ownership
rule,154 the dual network rule, 155 the local radio ownership rule,
156
and the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule. 57 In 2004,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected a
relaxation of the six broadcast ownership rules currently in
force. 58 On December 18, 2007, the FCC decided to modify
slightly the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule, leaving
the other rules unchanged.'59 With regard to cable ownership,
the horizontal and vertical limits established by the FCC have
been reversed and remanded by the D.C. Circuit in Time Warner
Entertainment Co. v. FCC. 160  On December 18, 2007, the FCC
decided to reenact the reversed horizontal ownership limit of
thirty percent.' 6'
Congress); see also Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 396 (3d Cir.
2004).
'- 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b) (allowing the combination of two TV stations in the
same Designated Market Area, subject to certain restrictions). A less restrictive rule
was reversed in Prometheus. 373 F.3d at 414-21.
154 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(c) (allowing cross-ownership of broadcast radio and TV
stations, subject to certain restrictions). A less restrictive rule was reversed in
Prometheus. 373 F.3d at 399-411.
155 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(g) (2007) (allowing affiliation of a TV station with a
network, with the exception of combinations between or among ABC, CBS, Fox, and
NBC).
' 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(a)(1) (limiting local radio ownership, depending on the
number of stations in the same service). A less restrictive rule was reversed in
Prometheus. 373 F.3d at 425-34.
157 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(c)(2) (allowing a newspaper to own one commercial
broadcast station in the twenty largest markets, subject to restrictions).
158 See Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 425-34.
159 See Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Adopts Revision to
Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-Ownership Rule (Dec. 18, 2007), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-278932Al.pdf; see also In re
2006 Quadrennial Regulatory Review of the Commission's Broadcast Ownership
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, 21 F.C.C.R. 14460, 14460-61 & nn.1-2 (2006). The FCC also declared its
guiding principles consisting in the promotion of competition, diversity, and
localism. Id. at. 14461-62.
160 240 F.3d 1126, 1128-29, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (reversing the horizontal limit
of thirty percent on the number of subscribers that may be served by a multiple
cable operator and reversing the vertical limit of forty percent of channel capacity,
meaning that sixty percent of channels are reserved for non-affiliated firms).
Although 47 U.S.C. § 533 directs the FCC to impose ownership limits, no new rules
have been put in place.
16' Cf Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Adopts Rules To Promote
Diversification of Broadcast Ownership (Dec. 18, 2007), available at http://hraunfoss.
fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-279035Al.pdf (seeking further comment on
appropriate vertical ownership limits).
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In the European Union, as in the United States, member
states seek to secure diversity by adding specific regulation on
media ownership to the normal set of antitrust rules.'62 In
Germany, an independent commission (Kommission zur
Ermittlung der Konzentration im Medienbereich) is charged to
constantly assess media concentration. 6 ' There is a statutory
rebuttable presumption that a market share of thirty percent of
the audience compromises diversity; above this threshold, parts
of society are feared not to be heard anymore on the marketplace
of ideas. 164  Even if a provider stays below the thirty percent
limit, its dominant position in neighboring markets (for example,
print media) may be regarded as a threat to diversity.165 If the
threshold is met, no new licenses will be issued to the dominant
provider; the independent commission may order divestments or
may ask the provider to grant transmission time to third
parties.166
Effective protection of diversity needs specific rules on media
ownership and media concentration.' 67  General antitrust laws
162 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Nov.
4, 1986, 73 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 118 (158-59,
172-73) (F.R.G.); European Convention on Transfrontier Television art. 10bis, May
5, 1989, 132 Europ. T.S., available at http://conventions.coe.int/lTreaty/EN/
Treaties/Html/132.htm; see also Christine Cooper, Television on the Internet:
Regulating New Ways of Viewing, 16 INFO. & COMM. TECHN. L. 1, 11-12 (2007)
(discussing the U.K.'s media regulatory regime and, in particular, the regulation of
media ownership, which traditionally has been used to protect the pluralism in the
U.K.).
16 Interstate Broadcast Treaty, supra note 111, §§ 35(1)-(2), 37(1).
1 Id. §§ 26(2), 28(2); see also KOMMISSION ZUR ERMIITLUNG DER
KONZENTRATION IM MEDIENBEREICH [COMMISSION ON CONCENTRATION IN THE
MEDIA], SIEBTER JAHRESBERICHT [SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT] 194 (2003-2004),
available at http://www.kek-online.de/Inhalte/jahresbericht_03-04.pdf; KEK, SAT.1
SATELLITENFERNSEHEN GMBH: UBERNAHME SAMTLICHER ANTEILE AN DER
PROSIEBENSAT.1 MEDIA AG DURCH DIE AXEL SPRINGER AG-AKTENZEICHEN, KEK
293-1 BIS -5 BESCHLUSS [TAKEOVER OF PROSIEBENSAT.1 MEDIA AG BY AXEL
SPRINGER AG] 70, 79 (2006) [hereinafter TAKEOVER OF PROSIEBENSAT. 1], available
at http://www.kek-online.de/cgi-bin/resi/v-ent/416.html; cf Bundesverfassungs-
gericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 16, 1981, 57 Entscheidungen
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 295 (322-24) (F.R.G.).
16 TAKEOVER OF PROSIEBENSAT.1, supra note 164, at 80.
166 Interstate Broadcast Treaty, supra note 111, art. 26(3), 26(4), 30, 32.
167 See PETER HETICH, WIRKSAMER WETrBEWERB: THEORETISCHES KONZEPT
UND PRAXIS [EFFECTIVE COMPETITION: THEORETIC CONCEPT AND CASE LAW] 403
(2003). But see Owen, supra note 19, at 672, 688 (concluding that the ownership
rules duplicate "antitrust law enforcement and should therefore be abolished as
wasteful of public resources and a burden on consumer welfare").
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aim at dispersion of power and long-term protection of
innovation, which is not always in line with protection of
diversity.16 Media ownership rules require, however, careful
design in order to prevent inefficient market structures and
undue sacrifices in efficiency. 69 Market analysis in the media
sector, for example, is unlikely to be accomplished by generic, off-
the-shelf techniques. 7 ° Media markets are interrelated, with a
daily newspaper sometimes being easily substitutable by sources
on the Internet; to some degree, broadcasting may even be
substituted by a newspaper and vice versa. 17' We observe print
media offering short video clips on the web and broadcasters
creating newspaper-like content. Current rules on media
ownership focus on traditional broadcasting, which is not
adequate in times of convergent media. The FCC rules on media
cross-ownership only half-heartedly embrace a convergent
approach. In the process of approving the merger between the
only two satellite radio providers, XM and Sirius, the U.S.
Department of Justice acknowledged that satellite radios do not
form a market entirely distinct from other audio sources,1 72
thereby implicitly acknowledging convergence in media markets.
D. Behavioral Restraints and Content Restrictions
Under the First Amendment, the FCC has few powers to
prohibit the broadcasting of any opinion on any subject. There
are highly disputed restrictions on promoting political
166 Cf Owen, supra note 19, at 677.
169 Id. at 681 (arguing that rules on radio station ownership have imposed
significant costs on society).
170 See EUROPE ECONOMICS, MARKET DEFINITION IN THE MEDIA SECTOR:
ECONOMIC ISSUES 6 (2002), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/
publications/studies/european economics.pdf.
171 See Rekurskommission ftir Wettbewerbsfragen [Competition Appeals
Commission], May 4, 2006, 2006/2 Recht und Politik des Wettbewerbs [Law and
Politics of Competition] [RPW] 347, 370 (Reko/Wef FB/2004-4) (Switz.).
12 See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice
Antitrust Division on its Decision To Close its Investigation of XM Satellite Radio
Holdings Inc.'s Merger with Sirius Satellite Radio Inc. (Mar. 24, 2008), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/Marcl/08.at_226.html. But see Press Release, Fed.
Commc'ns Comm'n, Commission Approves Transaction Between Sirius Satellite
Radio Holdings Inc. and XM Satellite Radio Holdings, Inc. Subject to Conditions
(July 28, 2008), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-
284108Al.pdf (evaluating the merger under "worst case" assumptions, for example,
that the relevant market is limited to satellite digital audio radio service).
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candidates, 173 standards for children's TV programming, 17 4 bans
on obscene and restrictions on indecent programming, 175
prohibitions on broadcast hoaxes,1 76 and rules on payola and
sponsorship identification.177 Other statutes ban advertisements
for lotteries and tobacco. 17  Private TV stations are free to set
times and rates for their advertisement slots. Public service
broadcasters and other noncommercial TV stations acknowledge
their donors by airing "underwriting spots," which are subject to
regulatory restrictions such as times and language.7 9 Offending
speech with regard to religion, race, national background,
gender, and the like is protected by the First Amendment, with
the only exception of speech constituting a "clear and present
danger" to the public.8 °
The new European Audiovisual Media Services Directive
submits all "TV-like" media services providers to a set of
stringent rules. Its provisions contain no exception for small or
private websites offering on-demand services or linear
programming.' At least, the preamble expresses an intention to
cover mass media only, leaving out noncommercial services not in
competition with TV broadcasting.18 2 Thus, the European Union
seeks to cover mass media "which are intended for reception by,
and which could have a clear impact on, a significant proportion
173 See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2676
(2007). The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 makes it a federal crime for a
corporation to use its general treasury funds to pay for any "electioneering
communication." 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. I 2002). In Wisconsin Right to
Life, two Justices held that the statute was unconstitutional as applied, while three
Justices argued that the statute was unconstitutional on its face. 127 S. Ct. at 2673.
See also McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 330 (2003). There is also
the requirement to afford equal broadcast opportunities to candidates for public
office. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)-(b) (2000 &
Supp. 1 2002).
174 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 303a, 303b (West 2008).
175 See supra Part I.C.
176 47 C.F.R. § 73.1-217 (2008).
177 47 U.S.C. §§ 317, 508 (2000); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (2008).
178 FED. COMMCN'S COMM'N MEDIA BUREAU, supra note 131, at 18, 22.
179 47 U.S.C. § 399b (2000); 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.503, 73.621 (2008); see also
Producing for PBS: Funding Standards and Practices, http://www.pbs.org/
producers/guidelines/index.html (Last Visited Nov. 7, 2008).
180 FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N MEDIA BUREAU, supra note 131, at 12-13.
181 See Council Directive 89/552, art. 1(a), (e), (g), 1989 O.J. (L298) 23 (EC),
amended by Council Directive 1997/36, 1997 O.J. (L202) 60 (EC), and Council
Directive 2007/65, 2007 O.J. (L332) 27 (EC).
182 See Council Directive 2007/65, pmbl. 16, 2007 O.J. (L332) 27 (EC).
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of the general public."' However, who could deny that then
presidential candidate Barack Obama's speech on race, published
on YouTube, had such an impact?18 1 It is an open question
whether the member states will use the Directive as a pretext to
regulate services like YouTube. Regulation by European
democracies may just hamper the development of these new
outlets for communication, but authoritarian countries have
started to use media, information, and electoral laws as
instruments to suppress Free Speech. In 2007, for example,
"Uzbekistan changed its media law to count all websites as 'mass
media'-a category subject to Draconian restriction.""8 5
Under the European Directive, all media service providers
shall identify themselves, shall refrain from inciting hatred
based on race, sex religion, or nationality, and shall make their
services gradually accessible to the disabled.186 Advertisements
("commercial communications") shall be recognizable as such,
shall not be surreptitious, shall not use subliminal techniques,
shall not promote discrimination, and shall not encourage
behavior prejudicial to health or to the protection of the
environment. Further provisions restrict commercials for
alcoholic beverages, medicinal products, and commercials
directed towards minors.187 Minors shall not be able to access
certain On-Demand Services that might impair their physical,
mental, or moral development. 8 8 Advertisements in traditional
TV are subject to stricter rules, in particular if inserted during
programs.'8 9  Sponsorship in TV is regulated, and product
183 Id.
184 See Larry Rohter & Michael Luo, Groups Respond to Obama's Call for
National Discussion About Race, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2008, at A21.
185 See Blog Standard; Politics on the Web, ECONOMIST (London), June 28, 2008.
186 See Council Directive 89/552, art. 3a-d, 1989 O.J. (L298) 23 (EC), amended
by Council Directive 1997/36, 1997 O.J. (L202) 60 (EC), and Council Directive
2007/65, 2007 O.J. (L332) 27 (EC).
187 Id. arts. 3e, 15; see also, e.g., Interstate Broadcast Treaty, supra note 111,
§7.
188 Council Directive 89/552, art. 3h, 1989 O.J. (L298) 23 (EC), amended by
Council Directive 1997/36, 1997 O.J. (L202) 60 (EC), and Council Directive 2007/65,
2007 O.J. (L332) 27 (EC).
189 Id. arts. 11, 18 (directing that advertising during programs shall not
prejudice the integrity of the program; films and news may be interrupted once for
each scheduled period of at least thirty minutes, and the proportion of advertising
spots within a given clock hour shall not exceed twenty percent). Stricter rules for
linear audiovisual media (TV) are justified by the diminished control of the spectator
over content. See Press Release, European Union, Presenting the New Audiovisual
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placement, as a general rule, is prohibited. 190  Television
broadcasts must not contain pornography or gratuitous
violence.191 Other programs potentially "detrimental" to minors
shall be aired, for example, at times when they are normally not
seen or heard by minors.192 TV broadcasters have to grant a
right to reply to persons, whose legitimate interests, reputation,
or good name have been damaged by an assertion of incorrect
facts in a TV program. 19 3
Several decisions of the German Constitutional Court point
out that free speech needs to be secured by regulating
broadcasters.1 94 All TV stations have to respect constitutional
principles like human dignity and tolerance of diverging opinions
and must uphold principles of good journalism.1 95 Some states in
Germany have audiovisual media promote gender equality,196
protection of minorities,1 97 and protection of the environment, 198
as well as international dialogue and peace.199 Public service
broadcasters are deemed to have a special responsibility in
Media Services Without Frontiers Directive (May 24, 2007), available at
http'/europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do.
190 Council Directive 89/552, art. 3f-g, 1989 O.J. (L298) 23 (EC), amended by
Council Directive 1997/36, 1997 O.J. (L202) 60 (EC), and Council Directive 2007/65,
2007 O.J. (L332) 27 (EC) (providing extensive exceptions with regard to product
placement for films, sports programs, light entertainment, etc.); see also, e.g.,
Interstate Broadcast Treaty, supra note 111, § 8.
191 Council Directive 89/552, art. 22, 1989 O.J. (L298) 23 (EC), amended by
Council Directive 1997/36, 1997 O.J. (L202) 60 (EC), and Council Directive 2007/65,
2007 O.J. (L332) 27 (EC).
192 Id.
193 Id. art. 23.
194 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb.
22, 1994, 90 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 60 (88)
(F.R.G.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 5,
1991, 83 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 238 (296)
(F.R.G.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June
16, 1981, 57 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 295 (320)
(F.R.G.).
191 Interstate Broadcast Treaty, supra note 111, § 41(1); Media Law of Baden-
WUrttemberg, supra note 142, § 3(1); Hessian Media Law, supra note 145, § 13(1);
Bavarian Media Law, supra note 142, art. 5(1); Media Law of Saarland, supra note
146, § 15(2); Media Law of Rhineland-Palatinate, supra note 145, § 31(1).
196 Media Law of Baden-Wuirttemberg, § 3(1); Hessian Media Law, § 13(1);
Media Law of Saarland, § 15(2); Media Law of Rhineland-Palatinate, § 31(1).
197 Hessian Media Law, § 13(1).
198 Id.
199 Media Law of North Rhine-Westphalia, supra note 142, § 31(3); Media Law
of Bremen, supra note 146, § 14(2); Media Law of Saarland, supra note 146, § 15(2);
Media Law of Rhineland-Palatinate, supra note 145, § 31(1).
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shaping and displaying public opinion. 200  Thus, public service
broadcasters have a statutory mandate for impartiality and
balance." 1 Further, their advertisement time is restricted to
twenty minutes daily.0 2 Public service broadcasting, according
to the German Constitutional Court, enables regulators to relax
slightly the standards for private broadcasters, in particular with
regard to impartiality and balance.0 3 Still, major churches and
political parties during elections have a right to demand
transmission time from all TV stations. 4
This Article will not deny the compelling interest of
governments in protecting minors from harm, such as
confrontation with sexually explicit material, with surreptitious
commercials, or with tobacco and alcohol advertisements directed
at young people. However, serious flaws render the current
regulatory framework partly overreaching, partly grossly
fragmentary. It is overreaching, because the current framework
aims at the source of content, thereby affecting minors as well as
adults. It is fragmentary, because great efforts are directed at
preventing minors from seeing revealed breasts or hearing filthy
words on broadcast and cable,0 ' while access to hard
pornography on the Internet is as easy as operating a remote
control. The new European Audiovisual Media Service Directive
seeks to implement a holistic approach, regulating audiovisual
media using the Internet as well as airwaves. However, the
directive is bound to fail in regulating audiovisual media
providers in off-shore countries beyond the European Union's
jurisdiction. This failure should not result in abandoning efforts
to protect minors. However, the prospect of imposing a
broadcast-like regulation on the whole Internet raises serious
First Amendment concerns, even if for the purpose of protecting
minors. These concerns may only be resolved by shifting part of
200 Interstate Broadcast Treaty, supra note 111, § 11.
201 Id.
202 Id. § 16(5) (vesting the states with the power to extend daily advertisement
time to ninety minutes).
203 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Nov.
4, 1986, 73 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 118 (159)
(F.R.G.).
204 Interstate Broadcast Treaty, supra note 111, § 42; Media Law of Baden-
Wtirttemberg, supra note 142, § 5; Media Law of North Rhine-Westphalia, supra
note 142, § 36; Media Law of Saarland, supra note 146, § 19.
200 See supra note 94.
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the responsibility to protect minors to the receiving ends of
audiovisual media communications, that is, to parents and
guardians. 2°6 This approach calls for moderation in regulating an
infant audiovisual industry on the Internet, for imposition of
restraints on all TV like audiovisual media and for the
strengthening of existing blocking possibilities in end-user
devices (e.g., an improved V-Chip or other parental controls).0 7
E. Culture Quotas
In the United States, the CPB has a statutory mandate to
promote programs of high quality, diversity, creativity,
excellence, and innovation. 20 8  The CPB has full discretion in
fulfilling its obligations under the mandate. 0  Private
programmers are not subject to requirements promoting any
kind of specific programming, with an exception being the
Children's Television Act of 1990.210
The new Audiovisual Media Services Directive requires all
TV-like media to reserve at least ten percent of their
transmission time and ten percent of their programming budget
for European works created by independent producers.21'
Further, a majority of their transmission time must be reserved
for European works. 212 In the same way, on-demand services
shall promote, where practicable and by appropriate means,
production and access to European audiovisual works.1 3 Since
these services deliver "on-demand," that is, on the request of the
consumer, the consumer cannot be coerced to consume European
works. However, European member states may regulate the
206 See TANYA BYRON, SAFER CHILDREN IN A DIGITAL WORLD: THE REPORT OF
THE BYRON REVIEW 6-10 (2008), available at http:J/www.dcsf.gov.uk/byronreview/
pdfs/Final%20Report%20Bookmarked.pdf; see also, e.g., Interactive Digital Software
Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954, 960 (8th Cir. 2003) (arguing that the state
cannot "silence protected speech," such as violent video games, "by wrapping itself in
the cloak of parental authority").
207 See infra Part III.B.
208 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
209 See id.
210 See supra note 84.
211 Council Directive 89/552, art. 5, 1989 O.J. (L298) 23 (EC), amended by
Council Directive 1997/36, 1997 O.J. (L202) 60 (EC), and Council Directive 2007/65,
2007 O.J. (L332) 27 (EC).
212 See id. art. 4 (stating that the requirement is subject to practicability and to
appropriate regulatory means and that transmission time excludes time for news,
sports events, games, advertising, teletext services, and teleshopping).
212 Id. art. 3(i).
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financial contribution that such on-demand services have to
spend for European works, as well as the share and prominence
of European works in the catalogue of programs offered.214
Progress reports of the European Commission show that the
share of European works amounts currently to sixty percent and,
therefore, exceeds the required threshold of fifty percent by far.215
Until recently, the European audiovisual industry lagged
hopelessly behind America. In 1996, nearly seventy percent of
feature films in TV were made in the United States. 216  The
American film industry dominated Europe, because its "shows
[were] cheap, top quality, and breach[ed] the language barrier."217
While Europeans could accept dominance of United States'
products in other sectors (for example, the dominance of Coke
and Pepsi in soft drinks), feature films and cinematographic
works have been regarded as cultural products deserving
protection.21 8 The European film industry was pepped up with
great efforts. Because the share of European works is now easily
above the fifty percent threshold, 219 a phase out or at least a
reconsideration of the culture quotas for broadcasters seems
appropriate.
F. Anti-Siphoning
Anti-siphoning rules prevent pay-TV broadcasters, such as
HBO, from bidding away the most appealing programs in sport,
feature films, and other important events. If programs are
siphoned away, they may be viewed by subscribers only and are
unavailable for showing on free TV. In the United States, the
FCC's anti-siphoning rules were successfully challenged in Home
Box Office, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission.20 The
FCC did not try to enact such rules again.221
214 Id.
215 EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM 2006/459) § 3 (2006).
211 See Kevin M. McDonald, How Would You Like Your Television: With or
Without Borders and With or Without Culture: A New Approach to Media Regulation
in the European Union, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1991, 2015 (1999).
217 Id. at 1995 (quoting Steven Greenhouse, The Media Business: For Europe,
U.S. May Spell TV, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1989, at D1).
218 See Kaplan, supra note 12, at 345-46 (arguing that in this respect, the
confrontation between the United States and Europe is a "dialogue of the deaf").
219 EuR. PARL. Doc. (COM 2006/459) § 3 (2006).
220 Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that
the FCC's regulation on siphoning and its restrictions on advertising in pay cable TV
are not justified and are grossly overbroad). The FCC failed to show that the
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In Europe, events that are regarded as being of major
importance for society may not be broadcast exclusively on pay
TV; these events are required to be accessible for the public on
free TV.222 Each European member state may draw up a list of
such events and determine the extent of coverage on free TV.223
In addition, any broadcaster has the right to access events of
major interest for short news reports.224  In Germany and
Switzerland, the lists of events of major importance only contain
sports events; some countries have added other cultural events
as well.225 Unfortunately, the only decision of the European
Court of Justice regarding anti-siphoning rules was settled on
formal grounds, resulting in a lack of European precedents.226
Anti-siphoning rules distort competition between pay-TV
providers and providers of free TV, because pay-TV providers are
not allowed to compete with free TV in bids for "major events".
There is not much empirical evidence as to whether pay TV
would be able to siphon major events away from free TV. In the
United States, the FCC has declared that the record for
siphoning is insufficient to justify intervention.227 Sports rights
holders have several incentives to maximize their audience.
objectives to be achieved by anti-siphoning rules are also objectives for which the
Commission could legitimately regulate the broadcast media. Id.
221 See In re Implementation of Section 26 of the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 9 F.C.C.R. 3440, 3498 (1994), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/Orders/1994/orcb4014.txt. "Based on our
evaluation of the record, we conclude that siphoning or migration of sports
programming is not sufficiently prevalent to justify intervention at this time. We
therefore do not recommend adoption of siphoning legislation or regulations at this
time." Id.
222 Council Directive 89/552, art. 3(i), 1989 O.J. (L298) 23 (EC), amended by
Council Directive 1997/36, 1997 O.J. (L202) 60 (EC), and Council Directive 2007/65,
2007 O.J. (L332) 27 (EC).
223 See id. art. 3j.
224 Id. art. 3k.
225 For Germany, see 2000 O.J. (C277) 4 (EC); for Switzerland, see Verordnung
des UVEK vom 5. Oktober 2007 iber Radio und Fernsehen [UVEK Regulation on
Radio and Television] Nov. 1, 2007, SR 784.401.11 (Switz.), available at
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/784 401_11/app2.html. Only a few member states have
opted to include cultural events into the list of reserved events. For a compiled list,
see European Commission, Audiovisual and Media Policies, List of Major Events,
http://ec.europa.eulavpolicy/reg/tvwf/implementation/events-listindex-en.htm (last
visited Nov. 8, 2008).
226 See Case T-33/01, Infront WM AG v. Comm'n of the European Communities,
2005 E.C.R. 11-5897 (discussing Infront's claim that the anti-siphoning rules infringe
its existing rights to broadcast events of major importance for society).
227 See supra note 221.
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They might be ready to forego parts of their profits from
exclusive broadcast licenses in order to generate, from the broad
coverage of an event, higher profits from sponsoring. Most
"major events" to be aired on free TV are not governmental
functions, but are carried out by private, profit-maximizing
entities. On this basis, European governments might want to
ask themselves whether the guarantee of a "fundamental right to
watch soccer" is really warranted.22
G. Must-carry and Channel Positioning
For most of their channel capacity, cable operators and
satellite providers in the United States decide freely on which
programming to carry. However, cable operators are required to
carry the signal of certain local commercial and noncommercial
educational TV stations.229 Further, these stations are entitled to
privileged channel positions.23 °
DBS providers are subject to the must-carry obligations of
the Satellite Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization Act of
2004 ("SHVERA"). 2 1  SHVERA amends 47 U.S.C. § 338 and
imposes, among other things, a "carry one, carry all" rule.232 This
rule requires satellite carriers, which choose to take advantage of
the Act's statutory copyright license by carrying one broadcast
station in a local market, to carry all requesting stations within
the market.233 In order to reduce waste and to reuse frequencies,
a satellite provider will need to place local channels on spot
beams, narrowing the signal's footprint.23 4
The member states of the European Union may impose
must-carry obligations on providers of electronic communications
networks used for the distribution of radio or TV broadcasts to
the public. 235  All platforms, encompassing cable, satellites, as
22I Cf Dirk Kurbjuweit, Grundrecht Ful3ball [Fundamental Right to Soccer], DIE
ZEIT, 43/1997, http://www.zeit.de/1997/43/Grundrecht_Fussball.
229 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-535 (2000); 47 CFR § 76.56 (2008); see Turner Broad. Sys.
v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (upholding rules); see also supra notes 48-49.
230 47 C.F.R § 76.57 (2008).
211 Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809 (2004). SHVERA was enacted as title IX
of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005.
232 Id. at 3415.
213 The rule was upheld in Satellite Broad. & Commc'n Ass'n v. FCC., 275 F.3d
337, 343 (4th Cir. 2001).
224 Id. at 350 n.5.
215 Council Directive 2002/22, art. 31(1), 2002 O.J. (L108) 51 (EC). Although a
restraint of free trade in services, the European Court of Justice upheld must-carry
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well as Internet, that are used by a significant number of end-
users as the principal means to receive radio and TV broadcasts
may be subject to must-carry.236 These obligations shall meet
clearly defined general interest objectives and shall be
proportionate and transparent. 237 Germany has chosen to impose
a strict must-carry regime. According to new rules entering into
force in September 2008, platform providers for broadcast and
similar audiovisual media must use a third of their digital
capacity to distribute public service broadcasters, private
broadcasters with local news, local broadcasters, and open access
channels. 23 1  The next third of capacity must be filled with
programmers on the basis of diversity considerations.239 The
platform provider is free to make use of any remaining capacity,
subject to further requirements on the state level.24 °  In
Switzerland, public service broadcasters, in particular domestic
public service broadcasters, local broadcasters, and some foreign
public service broadcasters, are entitled to must-carry and
privileged channel positions, as in the United States.241
In the United States, must-carry rules seek "to protect free
local broadcasting from the perceived threat of elimination by
cable."242 In Europe, must-carry rules seek to protect the public
service broadcasters' cultural mission of balanced programming
and promotion of cultural diversity. 243 Must-carry rests on the
assumption that significant numbers of broadcasters will be
refused carriage on cable systems, and that these broadcasters
will either deteriorate or fail.2" Refusal of carriage is deemed to
be based almost always on anticompetitive behavior of the cable
requirements. See Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and of
the Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 49, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 1, 62;
Case C-250/06, United Pan-Europe Commc'ns Belg. SA v. Etat Belge, 2008 O.J.
(C51) 16 (EU).
236 Council Directive 2002/22, art. 31(1), 2002 O.J. (L 108) 51 (EC).
237 Id.
238 Interstate Broadcast Treaty, supra note 111, art. 52b(1)(1).
239 Id. § 52b(1)(2).
240 Id. § 52b(1)(3).
241 Bundesgesetz iber Radio und Fernsehen [RTVG] [Swiss Federal Law on
Radio and Television] Mar. 24, 2006, SR 784.40, arts. 53, 59, 62, 63(2) (Switz.).
242 Lutzker, supra note 48, at 477.
243 See, e.g., Botschaft zur Totalrevision des Bundesgesetzes tiber Radio und
Fernsehen [RTVG] [Report on the Revision of the Federal Law on Radio and
Television], Dec. 18, 2002, BB1. at 1569, 1636, 1638.
244 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997).
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operator.245  The statute, as well as the Supreme Court,
completely ignore the possible legitimate reasons to drop a local
broadcast channel, such as its lack of attractiveness to the
viewers. 2" The historically strong position of cable systems as
distribution platforms makes it look prone to abuses of market
power. However, with the emergence of competing platforms like
DBS, TV over telephone, and TV over the Internet, it seems quite
unreasonable to assume that cable operators would drop popular
broadcasters for less attractive cable channels.247 In contrast to
ownership limits protecting diversity, there is no apparent
reason why antitrust laws could not deal with any abuses of
market power with regard to carriage decisions, if any.248
Further, existing must-carry rules hardly take into account that
carriage of additional local broadcasters substitutes and silences
a cable program. The "right" to speak of such TV stations seems
as strong as the right of any other programmer. Must-carry
provisions are always discriminatory and award benefits that are
not based on competitive merits. Given the rather weak
constitutional basis of must-carry249 and the dramatic progress of
alternative platforms for distributing content, the arguments
supporting must-carry need to be revisited soon.
Closely related to must-carry is the regulation on channel
positioning. Regulators have grasped that the first few channel
positions are the programs most likely to be tuned into by the
245 Id. at 232-33 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
246 Id. at 233 ("It is undisputed that the broadcast stations protected by must-
carry are the 'marginal' stations within a given market .... ").
241 In Europe, with public broadcasters aggregating a market share of over
thirty percent, it seems even more unlikely that cable system operators might drop
these channels. See supra Part II.A.
24 See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,
605-11 (1985) (involving a refusal to continue a joint marketing arrangement); cf.
United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 408-09 (1912)
(denying other railroads access to the only existing bridge usable for railroads
crossing the Mississippi and terminating in St. Louis).
249 See, for instance, the D.C. Circuit's decisions before the enactment of the
1992 Cable Act in Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1454 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (holding that the FCC had failed to justify the regulations by sufficient
record), and Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 303 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (holding that the FCC's assertion that cable operators would drop local
broadcasts in the absence of must-carry requirements was contradicted by the
operators' behavior during the period between the Quincy decision and adoption of
the new, modified must-carry rules).
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audience.25 ° Innocent readers would regard the first few channel
positions on a cable or satellite system as an asset, which could
be auctioned off.251 Economists would argue, most probably, that
a front channel position should be owned by the TV station
making most use of it, that is, the TV station most ready to pay.
To regulate channel positions means to provide the audience with
incentives to tune into "desirable" channels, in other words, to
consume "desirable" content. The regulation of channel positions
discriminates between speakers and is deeply paternalistic, if not
unconstitutional. If distribution platforms like cable and
satellite systems are regarded as public forums, current rules on
must-carry and channel positioning combined amount to
preference of one type of speakers (local stations or public
service broadcasters) over others (large networks, private
broadcasters).252
H. Subsidies
CPB's federal appropriation in the Fiscal Year 2008 amounts
to $400,000,000 and is paid from general revenues.253 CPB
submits an annual request for Federal funding of public
broadcasting stations and programming; in the past, decisions on
the amount of federal support for public service broadcasting
have been made two years ahead of the fiscal year in which the
funding is allocated in order to reduce politically motivated
250 But see Owen, supra note 19, at 693 (arguing that every TV outlet available
to the community has equal potential as a source of ideas). For this assumption to
hold, however, perfect rationality of the audience seems to be required.
251 The question of whether such remuneration would be handed on to
consumers is mostly determined by the market power of the platform in question. A
strong platform provider rather can afford to keep earnings from channel auctions to
itself.
252 Cf Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393-
94 (1993) (holding that denying a church access to school premises for public viewing
of an allegedly religious film was in violation of free speech); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (access to state fair grounds);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (access to university meeting facilities);
Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167
(1976) (speakers at school board meeting); Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
546 (1975) (access to municipal theater).
25" See Corporation for Public Broadcasting, Purpose, Benefits and
Backgrounds, http://www.cpb.org/aboutcpb/financials/appropriation.
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interference.254 Nevertheless, CPB seems very vulnerable to
political meddling due to possible funding cuts.
25
The constitutional guarantees for public broadcasting in
Germany include guaranteed funding.25 6  Funding cuts, if
permissible, must not be based on programming decisions of a
public service broadcaster.2 7 Legislators in Germany are free to
determine the sources from which public broadcasters may draw
funds such as subsidies, fees, and advertisements. According to
the German Constitutional Court, however, a complete
withdrawal of subsidies would create a dependency on market
forces-a need to fill advertisements slots-and a threat to
diversity.258 Currently, the principal source of funding for public
service broadcasters is a mandatory levy on TV set owners; other
sources of funding are rather of secondary importance.2 9 In
2006, the levy on TV set owners yielded C7,286,239,960
($11,553,790,700).26o The amount of the levy must be set at a
sufficient level to cover all the expenses of basic service.261 Public
254 Id.
255 See Howard A. White, Fine Tuning the Federal Government's Role in Public
Broadcasting, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 491, 492-93 (1994); Oscar G. Chase, Public
Broadcasting and the Problem of Government Influence: Towards a Legislative
Solution, 9 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 62, 76-78 (1975); see also Chris Johnson,
Comment, Federal Support of Public Broadcasting: Not Quite What LBJ Had in
Mind, 8 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 135, 138-41 (2000) (arguing that public
broadcasting is a product of government control and is subject to numerous political
interests).
256 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb.
22, 1994, 90 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 60 (91)
(F.R.G.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar.
27, 1987, 74 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 297 (324,
342) (F.R.G).
257 See BVerfG, Mar. 27, 1987, 74 BVerfGE 297 (342) (F.R.G.).
251 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb.
5, 1991, 83 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 238 (311)
(F.R.G.); see also GERSDORF, supra note 108, at 26.
259 Interstate Broadcast Treaty, supra note 111, § 13.
260 See GEZ [COLLECTION AGENCY FOR THE LEVY ON TV SETS],
GESCHAFTSBERICHT 2006 [ANNUAL REPORT 2006] 37, available at http://www.gez.
de/e160/e161/e331/gb2006.pdf.
261 Interstate Broadcast Treaty, supra note 111, § 12(1); see also BVerfG, Feb.
22, 1994, 90 BVerfGE 60 (93-94); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal
Constitutional Court] Oct. 6, 1992, 87 Entscheidungen des Bundes-
verfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 181 (203) (F.R.G.); Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 5, 1991, 83 Entscheidungen des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 238 (298, 310) (F.R.G.) (noting that basic
service includes broadcasts with focus on a selection of specific topics or spectators);
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service broadcasters file their funding request with an
independent commission (Kommission zur Uberprifung und
Ermittlung des Finanzbedarfs der Rundfunkanstalten), which
assesses whether the requested funds are necessary to carry out
the broadcaster's programming. 62 The commission is not allowed
to assess whether the scope of basic service does cover the entire
broadcaster's programming;263  this restriction on scrutiny
severely limits its scope of supervision. Legislators approving
the funding requests are constitutionally bound to stick with the
assessment of the commission, which has only a small leeway for
deviations.2 64  Because legislators, like the commission, are not
allowed to challenge public broadcasters' programming
decisions, 26 public broadcasters are quite free to determine their
scope of operations without jeopardizing funding. Private
broadcasters do not share in this mandatory levy.266  Most
European governments allow public service broadcasters to seek
additional funds by selling, to a limited extent, time slots for
commercials. 267  Such "dual funding" poses a threat to
competition (siphoning of marketing budgets, predatory pricing
for advertising space), but is sanctioned by Interpretative
Protocol No. 32 on public broadcasting, annexed to the Treaty
establishing the European Community.268
Public service broadcasting is highly subsidized in Europe.
In Switzerland, a country with a population of only 7.5 million, a
levy similar to Germany generates CHF 1.2 billion for the benefit
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Nov. 4, 1986, 73
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 118 (158) (F.R.G.).
262 Interstate Broadcast Treaty, supra note 111, § 14(1);
Rundfunkfinanzierungsstaatsvertrag [RfinStV] [Interstate Treaty on Broadcast
Funding], Aug. 16-Sept. 11, 1996, amended by Vertrag, Mar. 1, 2007, GVB1. I at
206, §§ 1(1), 3(1) [hereinafter Treaty on Broadcast Funding].
263 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 22,
1994, 90 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 60 (93-94, 103);
Treaty on Broadcast Funding, supra note 262, § 3(1).
264 Treaty on Broadcast Funding, supra note 262, § 7(2).
265 BVerfG, Feb. 22, 1994, 90 BVerfGE 60 (94) (F.R.G.); Treaty on Broadcast
Funding, § 3(1).
266 Interstate Broadcast Treaty, supra note 111, § 43.
267 See supra Part II.D.
268 Interpretative Protocol (No. 32) On the System of Public Broadcasting in the
Member States, Annexed to the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 2006
O.J. (C 321) 1, 313.
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of a single public broadcasting company.269 Thus, the amount of
the levy is nearly twice the amount appropriated in the United
States, which contains a population of approximately 300 million.
Regulators in Switzerland have abused convergence to extend
the levy on all technical devices capable of receiving audiovisual
programming, including mobile phones and computers with
Internet connection. ° With this levy paid, regardless of actual
use of public service programming,271  the levy shows
characteristics of a general tax.
We would assume that public broadcasters use the levy to
produce and air programs, which have no possibility of obtaining
funding or which do not attract sufficient advertising from
private companies. This includes programming, which is not
sought by the consumer, but which nevertheless is deemed by the
broadcaster to be of cultural value.272 Unfortunately, European
broadcasters do not spend the subsidies on such cultural projects
alone; they use the funds to compete with private broadcasters
for audience and content . 3  Taking into account its size, the
subsidy has highly distorting effects on competition in
audiovisual media markets. This argument is easily illustrated
by some examples.
ARD and ZDF, the two largest public broadcasters in
Germany, have invested C71,200,000 ($112,901,840) in online
platforms, thereby creating one of the largest news gateways in
Germany. 274 Their platforms threaten traditional print media,
269 See Federal Office of Communications, Amount and Use of Reception Fees,
http://www.bakom.ch/themen/radio tv/00630/00631/index.html?lang=en# (last
visited Nov. 8, 2008).
271 See Billag [Collection Agency for the Levy on TV Sets], Details About Device,
httpJ/www.billag.chlweb/de/fragen-und antworten/geraet.html (last visited Nov. 8,
2008).
271 Id.
272 See Goodman, supra note 82, at 1394, 1404-15 (calling for a proactive media
policy altering the consumer).
273 See Arifio & Ahlert, supra note 32, at 405 (raising the question whether
public broadcasters are acting within their public service remit and whether they
are "unfairly using public money in new online services and excluding competitors"
by providing "a wide array of online services with public funding"); see also Jan
Freitag, Ich Weiss, Was Schlecht ftir Dich Ist [I Know What's Bad for You], SPIEGEL
ONLINE (F.R.G.), Mar. 25, 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/0,1518,
543405,00.html.
274 See KoMMISSION ZUR ERMITTLUNG DES FINANZBEDARFS DER
RUNDFUNKANSTALTEN [KEF] [COMMISSION ON FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS OF
BROADCASTING CORPORATIONS], 16. BERICHT [16TH REPORT] 209-10 (D2007)
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which have struggled to regain customers lost to the Internet by
building up online presence.275 While the portals of ARD and
ZDF are subsidized, the portals of state-independent print media
are not. Driving out the free press of the Internet seems,
however, hardly a helpful strategy to maintain diversity in media
markets.
Further, ARD and ZDF have used most of their transmission
time for information on politics and society.276 However, the
largest chunk of their money was spent on sports rights,
rendering sports the category of shows with the highest
production cost per transmission time. 7  Sports have eminent
significance for society and reports about sports are part of a
basic service in audiovisual media. 78  Nevertheless, in most
sports, public broadcasters bid for transmission rights in
competition with private TV stations, which mostly would air the
program without charging the audience. 279  As a consequence,
public service broadcasters do not merely supplement TV service
(for example, by broadcasting unpopular sports); they use their
subsidy to drive out private providers from functioning markets.
Entertainment and sitcoms are other dominant categories of
programming with a high cost/time ratio.28 0 In contrast to small
regional public service broadcasters,2 1  the large public
broadcasters in Germany do not distinguish themselves from
private TV stations; they do not fill niches, but compete for
market shares like private actors. Not surprisingly, the
[hereinafter COMMISSION ON FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS], available at
httpJ/www.kef-online.de/inhalte/berichtl6/kef 16bericht.pdf.
275 See ROBIN MEYER-LUCHT, NACHRICHTENSITES IM WETTBEWERB
[COMPETITION BETWEEN NEWS SITES] 113-22 (2005) (providing a competitive
analysis of four major news sites on the Internet).
276 Id. at 30.
277 Id. In the aftermath of the Olympics, commentators ridiculed German Public
Broadcasting for sending more journalists to Beijing than athletes. See Scharfe
Kritik an ARD und ZDF [Severe Criticism of ARD and ZDF], SPIEGEL ONLINE
(F.R.G.), Aug. 24, 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/0,1518,574016,
OO.html.
278 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Nov. 11,
1997, 1 BvF 1/91 (110) (F.R.G) (holding that the significance of sports does extend to
realms beyond mere entertainment). Sports are an important part of local and
national identity and form a broad base for interaction within the population.
279 For a compilation of current sports rights holders in Germany, see KEK
Online, http://www.kek-online.de/Inhalte/spre-rechte.pdf.
280 See COMMISSION ON FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS, supra note 274, at 30.
281 Id. at 32.
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acquisition of sports rights by public broadcasters was subject to
a European Commission investigation into the practice in
Germany.2 2  Germany's defense emphasized that a public
broadcaster, in order to fulfill its basic service mission, needs to
build up a brand to stay attractive to a larger audience.8 3
Vague definitions of the public service remits, lack of
transparency and accountability, and the distorting effects of the
financing regime described have induced the European
Commission to launch a public consultation on a future
framework for state funding of public service broadcasting; the
consultation ended on March 10, 2008.284 The Commission aims
to replace the current communication on state aid to public
service broadcasting 28 with a more stringent framework. Still,
the European Commission will probably continue to accept wide
definitions of the public service remits, such as "providing
balanced and varied programming," "fulfilling the democratic,
social and cultural needs," or "guaranteeing pluralism, including
cultural and linguistic diversity."2 6  Also, the European
Commission provides no hint as to how to accomplish the
balancing act of monitoring performance of public service
broadcasters with regard to their mission without undue
interference in programming and protected speech. 28 7  The
United States' funding system does not address this problem in
any better way.288 However, public service broadcasting takes
282 European Commission, Financing of Public Service Broadcasters in
Germany, (April 24, 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/
competition/state-aidlregister/iidoc/E-3-2005-WLWL-en-24.04.2007.pdf.
281 Id. 104 (detailing Germany's defense to the allegation of illegal state aid,
which implicitly confirms the role of public broadcasters, not as supplemental to, but
as competitors of private TV stations).
284 European Commission, Review of the Communication from the Commission
on the Application of State Aid Rules to Public Service Broadcasting 1-2 (January
10, 2008), http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/stateaid/reformlbroadcasting_
comm-questionnaire en.pdf.
285 Communication from the Commission on the Application of State Aid Rules
to Public Service Broadcasting, 2001 O.J. (C 320) 4, 5-11.
286 Id. at 8.
287 Id. at 9 (arguing that "it is not for the Commission to judge on the fulfillment
of quality standards: it must be able to rely on appropriate supervision by the
Member States").
288 See supra Part IL.A (pointing out that the funding from general revenues in
the United States is prone to political meddling and that public service broadcasters
in the United States have a very vague public service remit).
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place on a much smaller scale,28 9 thereby diminishing the scale of
the conflict as well as the effects on free speech.
III. ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES
A. Effects of Convergence in Audiovisual Media on Current
Regulatory Frameworks
Strict licensing regimes,290  restraints on private TV
stations,291 and subsidies2 92 have served perfectly to secure the
competitive position of local and public service programmers, at
least when space on transmission platforms was limited. Today,
the media markets provide huge amounts of content, in diverse
forms and on diverse platforms. Cable systems and satellites
carry an abundance of channels. Entry barriers into audiovisual
media markets have nearly disappeared: While building a
traditional broadcast station still asks for a large investment,293
it is possible to "Broadcast Yourself' on the Internet at negligible
cost. Video on Demand over cable or Internet introduces even
more choice and has freed the audience from others'
programming decisions. 294  TV, as Elihu Katz points out, "no
longer serves as the central civic space; one can no longer be
certain that one is viewing together with everybody else or
anybody else." 295  Thus, the preferential treatment of certain
289 Id.
290 See supra Part II.B.
291 See supra Part II.D.
292 See supra Part II.H.
293 See National Telecommunications and Information Admininstration,
Television Station Construction Costs, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ptfp/application/
EquipCost tv.html (Last Visited Nov. 8, 2008).
294 See Brian Seth Hurst, Kiss Convergence Goodbye, Welcome Exploitation,
MULTICHANNEL NEWS, May 15, 2000, at 117 (arguing that "[iun the digital
democracy," the viewer "exercises choice and control"; therefore, "the future of media
will belong to those who know how to deliver relevant programming, information
and services to where the audience is living"); see also Phil McRae, The Death of
Television and the Birth of Digital Convergence: (Re)shaping Media in the 21st
Century, STUD. MEDIA & INFO. LITERACY EDUC., May 2006, at 1 (pointing out that
digital convergence "has the potential to shift the power dynamics of television from
viewing (passive) to engaged participation (active) within a converged medium" and
that with interactive online TV, "the viewer has more control over what they
watch.., and how they choose to engage with the media").
295 Elihu Katz, And Deliver Us from Segmentation, in A COMMUNICATIONS
CORNUCOPIA 99, 101 (Roger F. Noll & Monroe E. Price eds., 1998); see Goodman,
supra note 82, at 1458.
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programming by broadcast and cable regulation is thwarted by
technological improvements. Governments try to channel the
dispersed audience towards preferred types of programming by
regulation on must-carry and channel positioning.296 However,
traditional linear programming or TV as we know it, which is
subject to these regulations, is on the decline. For example, ABC
already distributes popular episodes like "Lost" on-demand over
the Internet, ready for download just after the program has aired
on its linear channel.297 Many shows are available for illegal
download on BitTorrent sites, anyway. 298 New possibilities for
distribution like on-demand offers on the Internet will not
supplant traditional TV, but will alter it. 299 Traditional linear TV
will remain a significant platform for content, such as the
transmission of live events like the Super Bowl. However, there
is hardly any reason to force the audience into a fixed schedule of
linear programming when it comes to recorded shows like feature
films and sitcoms. In fact, the new on-demand offers of
traditional TV stations on the Internet acknowledge that the
consumer can already record and cut out commercials on his or
her Blu-ray or DVD recorder.
The described technological developments will further impair
the effectiveness of the current broadcasting regime, with all its
"spillovers" on cable and satellite platforms. In Europe, the new
Audiovisual Media Services Directive will put emerging TV
gateways on the Internet at a competitive disadvantage, because
local regulators will try to impose must-carry rules and rules on
preferential channel positioning on these providers. °° It seems
296 See supra Part II.G.
297 ABC, Full Episode Player, http://abc.go.com/player/ (Last Visited Nov. 8,
2008). Recently, MTV Networks joined in these developments and put nearly all the
episodes of South Park on the web. See South Park Episode Player,
http://www.southparkstudios.comlepisodes (Last Visited Nov. 8, 2008).
29 See Jim Finkle, BitTorrent Moves from Piracy to Video Streaming, REUTERS
(U.K.), Oct. 9, 2007, http://uk.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/idUKN08335308
20071009.
299 Cf Moritz Leuenberger, Heute der Trend, Morgen die Wahrheit [Today
Trends, Tomorrow Truth], UVEK, Oct. 25, 2007, http://www.uvek.admin.ch/
dokumentation00476/00477/01407/index.html?lang=de (claiming that new forms of
media never supplants, but alters traditional forms of conveying content); see also
Craig Dwyer, The Changing Face of Broadcasting: As Broadcast Converges with
Telecoms and IT Technology, New Opportunities Are Being Opened Up for Content
Delivery, INT'L BROADCAST ENGINEER, July 1, 2003, at 20.
301 See supra Part II.G. European regulation allows the imposition of must-carry
obligations on all providers regardless of the platform used. Council Directive
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grotesque that a broadcast regulator in Germany or France could
impose must-carry obligations for local channels on a worldwide
operating TV gateway on the Internet. Due to lack of jurisdiction
over the Internet, the FCC's own must-carry regulations will be
limited severely in scope as soon as new Internet gateways
become significant transmission platforms. Taking into account
the influx of other unregulated media in markets for video on-
demand, the FCC's regulations are set to fail as an instrument to
promote local and public service broadcasting.
On the face of it, lower barriers for market entry in
audiovisual services are certainly welcome for enhancing
diversity and promoting culture in audiovisual markets."'
Enhanced diversity provides a prima facie case for deregulation.
Legislators, thus, urgently need to reassess their arguments for
continued governmental intervention. Traditional market failure
justifications for intervention in audiovisual media markets such
as the "special nature" of media products, the qualification of
content as public good, or the assertion of ruinous competition
30 2
are obsolete in times of channel abundance.3 3 Other social
justifications for intervention such as disregard for minority
interests and inferior quality apply to virtually all cultural
2002/22, art. 31(1), 2002 O.J (L108) (EC). It also requires providers to display
European works more prominently. Council Directive 89/552, 1989 OJ (L298),
amended by Council Directive 1997/36, 1997 O.J. (L202) 60 (EC), and Council
Directive 2007/65, 2007 O.J. (L332) 27 (EC).
301 Communication from the Commission, supra note 285, at 5.
302 Such ex ante market failure assessments have even served to deny TV
stations access to broadcast markets on grounds that a second TV outlet may result
in economic injury to the existing, monopolistic provider. See Carroll Broad. Co. v.
FCC, 258 F.2d 440, 442-43 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
303 In C. Edwin Baker's static view of competition, even monopolistic ownership
of local broadcast channels may produce, in certain conditions, more beneficial
results than competition. See generally Baker, supra note 12, at 313-44. Baker bases
his argument on a market structure with three competing stations and three
programming categories, of which "70% of the audience strongly prefer type A, 20%
type B, and 10% type C." Id. at 241. He concludes that each of"the three competitors
are likely to provide type A, with each on average getting one-third of 70% (23-1/3%)
of the audience." Id. Moreover, "if a monopolist controlled all three channels, [with]
no incentive to compete with itself, it could introduce a different type of
programming on each channel... to increase its total audience. It would gain those
viewers who prefer B and C but do not bother to watch A," and, thus, increase
consumer welfare. Id. However, the result is completely different if only one
competitor is added: with four channels, each station would drop to an average
audience of below twenty percent, providing incentives to reach out to type B
consumers, as well. See id. Eventually, with at least eight stations, it is rational to
also provide broadcasting for type C consumers.
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industries. Such social justifications, as a consequence, provide a
rationale for intervention in either all media markets or none of
them. °4 Even if assuming that today's media markets work
inefficiently, provide inferior quality, and produce negative
externalities on democratic values,0 5 there is not much reason to
believe that governments or appointed officials would be in a
better position to judge quality than the audience. Assuming
that the quality of audiovisual content can be improved by
government intervention, regulators would still have to find ways
to compel or persuade the audience to watch the high-quality
content. This could be achieved by turning back the wheel and
promoting a monopolistic or oligopolistic market structure; the
scale of such an intervention is beyond anything permissible
under the First Amendment. 6
Because of the FCC's fragmentary regulatory powers, the
United States is set to be the testing ground for a deregulated,
pluralistic, partly atomistic audiovisual media market; it will
take years to assess the effects of this new market structure on
the quality and cultural diversity of audiovisual programming.
On the other side of the Atlantic, the technology-neutral
European approach is still bound to preserve the traditional
304 Madison Square Garden, for example, provides a venue for Alicia Keys on
June 18, but is not required by law to host "Stevie Wonder's Piano," a New York City
local rock band, as well. Madison Square Garden, thus, is not subject to a rule
mandating must-carry of local content. Neither is Ticketmaster required to lure
basketball fans into browsing through the current opera schedule before providing
them with an opportunity to buy tickets for the next Knicks game (Ticketmaster,
thus, is not required to privilege content by channel positioning).
305 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 12, at 414-15 (arguing that, beyond subsidies,
policies directed at encouraging the allocation of control over content creation to
people with commitments to quality rather than merely to the bottom line would
make media entities more responsive to the market); Cass R. Sunstein, Television
and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV. 499, 502-04 (2000) (arguing that public
interest requirements for broadcasters still make sense where channels abound, that
the concept of consumer-sovereignty is ill-suited to communications markets, and
that an unregulated media market cannot promote the aspiration to deliberative
democracy).
300 Unless, of course, intervention is based on the assumption that the consumer
might be altered or "elevated," and that the consumer will ask only for high quality
content in the long run. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 82, at 1404-14; Sunstein,
supra note 305, at 523 ("In any case it is likely that some people would watch the
resulting [public interest] programming and develop a taste for it. .. ."). There is no
empirical study on the elevation of the consumer by public interest programming
over a prolonged period of time; it is far more likely that such public interest
programming would serve to nourish content producers meeting insufficient demand
for their products.
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system of strong public service broadcasters. The European
community tries to reach this goal by expanding the scope of its
regulatory framework to new transmission platforms like the
Internet and to on-demand services. °7  Unfortunately, the
European Commission has only just started to reassess the role
of public broadcasters within converging audiovisual media
markets. 08 The new European Audiovisual Media Services
Directive leaves jurisdiction with regard to public service
broadcasting with the individual member states, with highly
distorting effects in the media markets. 9
Public service broadcasting, in particular, in Europe, is a
remnant of previously limited availability of broadcasting
frequencies and high barriers to entry. 10 A large part of the new
Audiovisual Media Services Directive is motivated by changes in
technology and consumer behavior and merely attempts to
protect the traditional public service broadcast system. 1' In an
attempt to preserve public service broadcasting, European
legislators have lost focus of the ultimate goal of state
intervention: the promotion of freedom of speech by maintaining
cultural diversity and localism.3 12 Regulators and courts recite
pluralism and diversity like a mantra313, but do not question the
instruments used to achieve these goals. It is widely
acknowledged that the state, as the ultimate guarantor of
pluralism and diversity, needs to implement a regulatory
framework to protect its guarantee of freedom of speech.3 14 The
state, being both the guarantor and potential aggressor to
freedom of speech31 , is required not to burden speech any more
307 See supra Part II.D.
308 See supra notes 284-285 and accompanying text.
309 Council Directive 2007/65, pmbl. 9, 2007 O.J. (L332) 27, 29 (EC) (referring
to the Council Resolution on Public Service Broadcasting, 1999 O.J. (C 30) 1, 2-3
(EU), and its affirmation of the member states' competence concerning remit and
funding).
310 Communication from the Commission, supra note 285, at 1.
311 Id. at IM 1-3 (emphasizing that technological changes have promoted
pluralism, but have also made it necessary to implement rules to protect and
maintain public service broadcasting).
312 See supra Part I.
313 See, e.g., Interpretative Protocol, supra note 268, 5; Council Resolution on
Public Service Broadcasting, supra note 124.
314 See supra Part I.A.
315 See Owen, supra note 19, at 674 (arguing that the idea of government
promoted information "is grounded in the image of government as a benign force in a
world beset with such evils as ignorance and prejudice"). Owen emphasizes that
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than is necessary for implementing its framework.1 Although
the European Commission started to challenge member states'
audiovisual media regulations on the grounds of excessive state
subsidies, the otherwise sweeping regulatory framework at
European and at state level shows limited self-restraint on the
side of the legislators.3 17  Legislators just assume that the
intrusive instruments described are still necessary to promote
diversity.
When transmission platforms and available channels are
abundant, the state does not generally look like a good choice for
acting as gatekeeper for content providers or for guaranteeing
fair and balanced programming. It is a longstanding democratic
principle that the government should have "no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or
its content" .3 1  The government is generally unfit to categorize
protected speech into more or less preferable forms.31 '9  The
First Amendment values "were established in an era, perhaps not yet fully behind
us, where government tyranny was the principal threat." Id.
316 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994); FCC v. League
of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984) ("[Tlhese restrictions have been
upheld only when we were satisfied that the restriction is narrowly tailored to
further a substantial governmental interest. . . ."); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 377, 396 (1969); see also Informationsverein Lentia v. Austria, 36 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 75 (2002) (holding that a public broadcast monopoly imposes the greatest
restrictions on freedom of speech, namely the total impossibility of broadcasting
otherwise than through a national station). The far-reaching character of such
restrictions means that they can only be justified where they correspond to a
pressing need. Id. The court continued that justification for these restrictions can no
longer be found in considerations relating to the number of frequencies and channels
available, as a result of the technical progress made over the last decades. Id.
317 See supra notes 284-285 and accompanying text.
318 Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (striking down an
ordinance prohibiting picketing near school buildings while school was in session,
because the ordinance made an impermissible distinction between labor picketing
and other peaceful picketing, thereby violating the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
319 See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50, 55 (1988) (holding that a
public figure may not recover damages for emotional harm caused by the publication
of an parody which was offensive to him). In Hustler, the Supreme Court stated:
If it were possible by laying down a principled standard to separate the one
from the other [political cartoon], public discourse would probably suffer
little or no harm. But we doubt that there is any such standard, and we are
quite sure that the pejorative description 'outrageous' does not supply one.
'Outrageousness' in the area of political and social discourse has an
inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose
liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis
of their dislike of a particular expression. An 'outrageousness' standard
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government is thus on thin ice when it continues to promote
single categories of broadcasters, even more so since access to
transmission platforms has become easier and abuses of market
power by platform providers less likely.
B. Urgent Need for Reform in Audiovisual Media Regulation
The list of public interest concerns affected by audiovisual
media is lengthy. It encompasses, for example, the need for
educational programming for children, closed-captioning,
diversity (that is, fighting homogenous programming), protection
of children from excessively violent or pornographic
programming, and sufficient news coverage (for example,
international news, news on political candidates).2 ° Some items
on the list are easily defended (protection of minors from obscene
programming; closed captioning), others raise strong First
Amendment concerns (public interest obligations with regard to,
e.g., diversity; preference for local or public broadcasters).
Some public interest concerns may not be served alone by
some broadcasters because their functioning relies on the
cooperation of all broadcasters. In particular, this is true with
regard to the protection of minors from indecent or obscene
programming. Current regulation charges most or all
programmers with public interest obligations concerning
minors. 21 In times of convergence, however, it seems futile to
protect children from indecent programming in broadcast and
cable, while pornographic material is readily accessible on the
Internet.32 2  Regulating pornographic on-demand offers on the
Internet merely makes providers move to less rigid jurisdictions,
thus runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow damages to be awarded
because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on
the audience.
485 U.S. at 55. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Court gave examples of categorized
speech, such as "the government may proscribe libel; but it may not make the
further content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the government," or
"a city council could [not] enact an ordinance prohibiting only those legally obscene
works that contain criticism of the city government or, indeed, that do not include
endorsement of the city government." 505 U.S. 377, 384 (1992); see also Owen, supra
note 19, at 695 (arguing that the localism policy fastens on a specific category of
ideas, which runs afoul of First Amendment values, such as discouraging national
voices by forcing them to speak through numerous local outlets).
320 See Sunstein, supra note 305, at 509-11.
321 See supra Part II.D.
322 See BYRON, supra note 206, at 49-50.
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rendering the domestic law largely ineffective. Keeping in mind
that space for further regulatory impediments at the source is
limited because of First Amendment requirements, legislators
need to shift their focus to the receiving ends of communications,
that is, on technical and legal measures to support and encourage
parents and guardians to protect their children, and on
international support for their efforts.323
A second category of public interest concerns does not
directly relate to the protection of the audience from physical and
psychological harms. They do not need to be imposed on all
programmers in order to fulfill their functions. Obligations like
closed-captioning provide "a critical link to news, entertainment,
and information for individuals who are deaf or hard-of-
hearing, "324 and serve important public interests. However, the
costs of providing closed-captions increase the barriers to market
entrance for small-content producers and small TV stations. At
the same time, it seems sufficient if larger audiovisual media
providers, defined by a certain threshold, provide closed captions
in their programming.3 25 The European Audiovisual Service
Directive lacks an exemption for small media corporations from
public interest obligations like closed captioning.326 The FCC's
regulation provides for an exemption if compliance with the
closed captioning requirement results in an undue burden. 27
However, the FCC only grants exemptions on the basis of an
extensive review process, which must be supported by sufficient
evidence and by an affidavit . 3  Thus, regulation lacks general
exemptions based on the size and financial capabilities of an
audiovisual media provider.
323 See id. at 5-6.
324 FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N CONSUMER & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS BUREAU,
FCC CONSUMER FACTS: CLOSED CAPTIONING 1 (2008), available at
http://ftp.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/closedcaption.pdf.
321 See 47 C.F.R. § 79.1(d)(12) (2008) (stating that for channels which produce
revenues under $3,000,000 are not required to expend any money to closed
captioning; however, the channel must pass through programming which is already
close-captioned when received).
321 See Council Directive 89/552, 1989 O.J. (L298) 23 (EC), as amended by
Council Directives 97/36 and 2007/65 (applicable to all audiovisual media services).
327 47 C.F.R. § 79.1(f) (2008).
328 See FED COMMC'NS COMM'N CONSUMER & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS BUREAU,
EXEMPTIONS TO THE CLOSED CAPTIONING REQUIREMENTS ON THE BASIS OF UNDUE
BURDEN (2008), available at http://ftp.fcc.gov/cgb/dro/caption-exemptions.html. But
see 47 C.F.R. § 79.1(d) (2008) (providing automatic exemptions for certain programs
and providers).
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A third category of public interest concerns addresses issues
relating to, according to some commentators, externalities
created by "public good" characteristics of content. 29  These
issues mostly relate to the quality of the programming, in
particular the neglect of democratic and cultural needs. Some
commentators aim to impose quality requirements on all
programmers, in accordance with the current European
approach.30' This approach would continue the persistent
discrimination between audiovisual broadcast media and other
media. Theoretically, convergence would require authors to
write better books and newspaper articles as well. Some
commentators seek to implement complex trading schemes,
which would allow media providers to trade their public interest
obligations in the same way as emission trading schemes. Such
trading would be less intrusive, and would permit some TV
stations to increase their public interest programming for
remuneration, while other stations would be able to pursue their
purely commercial programming.3 It is indisputable that such a
trading scheme would raise complex questions regarding pricing.
For example, public interest programming during prime time
seems more valuable than public interest programming during
the night. Further, public interest programming might differ in
quality and production cost, which should be considered in
pricing. Finally, implementation, monitoring, and enforcement
of such a trading scheme seem costly. As a consequence, an
increase in public interest programming and programming
flexibility might not be worth the effort of setting up the trading
scheme in terms of costs end inefficiency.
There are simpler ways to provide services of public interest.
Existing public service broadcasters should be first in line to
supplement current market offers with public interest
programming. Currently, public service broadcasters are not
designed to fulfill this role in the United States or Europe. In the
United States, small budgets let public broadcasters starve,
making it difficult for them to continuously reach large mass
audiences with "programs of high quality, diversity, creativity,
329 See Baker, supra note 12, at 316, 319; Goodman, supra note 82, at 1415-19.
330 See Sunstein, supra note 305, at 544.
331 See id. at 545.
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excellence, and innovation ...... " Thus, U.S. public service
broadcasters appear too weak to make a significant difference to
overall programming. Stable and adequate funding for public
service broadcasters in the United States, however, will meet
resistance from legislators while public service broadcasters are
not accountable for their performance. In contrast, public service
broadcasters in Europe have been nourished by huge,
constitutionally protected subsidies .333 The established
accountability mechanisms with regard to the quality of their
programming and the general scope of their activities (for
example, in traditional markets of the printing press) have
proven to be rather weak. Their market power 334 and the
regulatory framework protecting them335 have made European
public service broadcasters a threat to diversity, rather than its
promoter.
Reforming public service broadcasting means establishing
sufficient accountability and defining limits to the scope of
operations. Direct state supervision, for constitutional reasons,
is restricted, and states must not interfere in programming even
of public service broadcasters. In deviation from traditional
monitoring and enforcement, an independent performance
benchmark might be sufficient to hold public service broadcasters
accountable. A cost benchmark may be easily established by
introducing competitive elements in the provision of public
interest programming. Bidding for subsidies would drive down
costs of public interest programming to efficient levels, while
opening public service provision to all market participants. 3 6
There is no reason why subsidies should remain tied to public
service broadcasters instead of individual, independent content
producers. 37  Further, comparative assessments of the market
332 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); see, e.g., Baker, supra note
12, at 414.
13 See supra Part II.H.
334 See supra Part II.A.
331 See supra Part II.B-H.
336 See Goodman, supra note 82, at 1464 (arguing that "[tihe use of
subsidies ... permits government to pursue media policy goals ... with far less
formidable First Amendment constraints" than by using regulation); cf. Sunstein,
supra note 305, at 542-43 (proposing a tax on undesirable programming instead of
subsidies, which both have the same effect from an economic perspective).
" See, e.g., Broadcasting Act 1989, [19891 No. 025, § 36 (N.Z.). The
Broadcasting Commission of New Zealand ("NZ On Air") promotes content which
reflects and develops identity and culture, in particular, Maori language and culture.
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appeal of individual public interest programs, that is, market
shares in relevant target groups such as children, could add a
performance element to the benchmark. Benchmarking public
interest programming with other public interest programming
frees public service broadcasting from mimicking commercial
broadcasters. It provides criteria for the allocation of funds to
public service providers, and therefore, also provides the means
to punish poor performance without giving rise to political
meddling. 38 The role of government, if any, would be limited to
choosing the categories of programming to be supported:
educational, local, or other programming. Such channeling of
subsidies to specified categories of programming will also put an
end to the expansion of public service broadcasters to markets
traditionally served by the private printing press, in particular to
the formation of news-platforms on the Internet.
CONCLUSION
Diversity of opinions is the overarching goal of media
regulation. Policies to promote localism, cultural expressions,
and quality of programming may be qualified as sub-goals of a
broader diversity policy. Progress in technology has vastly
increased the amount of available transmission platforms and
available channels for audiovisual media content. Such
abundance promotes diversity and constitutes a prima facie case
for deregulation of audiovisual media, in particular broadcast
media. Attention of the audience, however, is scarce;339 also, the
audience may not be willing to invest large amounts of time in
seeking out new offers in the audiovisual landscape. It is very
likely that even an unlimited amount of channels will not result,
eo ipso, in a vivid marketplace of ideas or diversity of opinions. 40
See id. § 36(a)(ii); Karl-Jascha Schneider-Marfels, Auslandsmedien: Heimatschutz
oder Wettbewerb? [Foreign Media: Protectionism or Competition?], 125-I ZEITSCHRIFT
FUR SCHWEIZERISCHES RECHT 339, 342 (2006). But see Mary Debrett, Branding
Documentary: New Zealand's Minimalist Solution to Cultural Subsidy, 26 MEDIA
CULTURE & Soc'Y 5, 5-20 (2004).
338 See Hettich, supra note 104, at 247-51 (arguing that benchmarking instead
of monitoring postal providers supersedes the need for regulators).
339 See Simon, supra note 30, at 40-41.
340 See Ingber, supra note 32, at 38 (arguing that "monopolistic practices,
economies of scale, and an unequal distribution of resources have made it difficult
for new ventures to enter the business of mass communications"). The marketplace
of ideas' inevitable bias supports entrenched power structures, supporting those
ideas appealing to the self-interest of individuals who manage the media. Id. at 39.
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On this basis, the government may still justify intervention in
audiovisual media markets. However, any government scheme
has to be justified by clearly improving diversity or "aggregate"
free speech, as compared to the status quo.
Largely the same instruments of governance are applied in
audiovisual media markets in the United States and in Europe.
Licensing schemes and ownership limits seek to guarantee a
broad distribution of available content outlets. Behavioral
restraints aim to protect minors, but also impose public interest
requirements on audiovisual media providers, predominantly in
Europe. The attention of the audience is channeled to preferred
content, that is to content produced by local TV stations and
public service broadcasters. Public service broadcasters are
mandated to raise the quality of content to an acceptable level, to
shine as bright stars within a landscape of dull and uninteresting
commercial programming. The European Union recently decided
to refine the use of these instruments. Its new Audiovisual
Media Services Directive extends the existing regulatory
framework to all transmission platforms, including the Internet.
The FCC, as well, seems unlikely to abandon broadcast
regulation with all its spillovers to cable, satellite, etc. in the
near future.
Current regulation is designed for, and favors, providers of
classical linear programming. Regulators have chosen to ignore
imminent changes in market structure and the way TV is
provided. With increasing capacity of transmission platforms, we
may expect increased market entry in audiovisual media markets
and growth of on-demand services. In these circumstances,
current regulation will no longer succeed in directing the
audience's attention to preferred content providers. Although
regulatory failure is at hand within a few years, to date rightly
no regulator has proposed forcing its preferred providers' content
onto audiences in order to protect those providers and to prevent
audience dispersion. In the upcoming market transformation,
current regulation will still have distorting effects on competition
between content providers and may hamper the development of
new audiovisual media services. In the worst case scenario,
audiovisual media regulation might disturb other media
markets, particularly those served by the printing press, which
are facing convergence with audiovisual media markets.
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Convergence confronts regulators with the choice of either
abandoning broadcast regulation or extending their grip to
unregulated media markets, running the risk that their
regulation remains fragmentary and limited in its effectiveness.
This Article suggests that the scale of regulatory intervention
needs be matched with the importance of public interests
involved. Regulation needs to be applied equally to all
audiovisual media irrespective of the technology or distribution
platform involved. There are public interest concerns, which
should be respected by all audiovisual media providers,
regardless of their size. In particular, these public interests
relate to the protection of minors from obscene or violent
programming; however, the international nature of the Internet
will also require regulators to refocus their attention, from
regulation of the source, to regulation of the receiving ends of
communication. Other programming requirements, such as the
provision of closed-captions, should apply only to programmers
whose market share or financial capabilities meet certain
thresholds.
Requirements regarding the content and quality of
programming, such as provisions aiming to increase the share of
children's programming or decreasing the share of commercials,
however, are inappropriate when applied exclusively to
traditional TV-like media. In times of convergence, public
interest requirements would have to be applied to all audiovisual
media or none. Regulatory standards for content and quality
standards for all media would force a role on the government,
which it is not entitled to hold by virtue of the First Amendment.
Thus, governments wishing to increase the quality of
programming or to promote certain categories of programming
are left with the option to provide financial incentives for such
programming, by subsidizing either public service broadcasters
or producers of content. This Article argues in favor of a
combination of subsidies to public service broadcasters, as well as
to independent producers of content. While public service
broadcasters provide for an easily accessible transmission
platform, enjoyment of freedom of expression has rendered them
largely unaccountable to the public. By introducing a scheme of
competitive bidding for subsidies, a benchmark revealing
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cost-efficient levels of public interest programming is established.
Some subsidies should be allocated according to the relative
performance or success of public interest programmers in the
past, thereby partly removing the need for selective judgments by
government entities.
